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This thesis examines how local law enforcement agencies can adopt unmanned 
aircraft, or drones, as tools to help them perform their public safety missions while 
earning the support and trust of the communities they serve for the use of this 
controversial technology. The paper presents the current state of the law surrounding 
drone use by the police, along with published recommendations on drone implementation 
and trust-building practices. Through the use of a structured multicase study and 
comparative analysis, the author tests the validity of the drone-specific recommendations 
of groups like the International Association of Chiefs of Police, American Civil Liberties 
Union, and Community Oriented Policing Office of the United States Department of 
Justice. The case studies also examine the influence of factors like demographics, 
political affiliation, crime rate, and pre-existing community law enforcement 
relationships on the success or failure of an agency’s drone adoption efforts. Based on the 
analysis of the case studies, the thesis provides a recommended process to follow for law 
enforcement leaders looking to implement their own drone programs using evidence-
based practices to earn the trust of their citizens. 
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The police have long recognized the critical observation and decision-making 
advantages provided by the use of aircraft to give an aerial view. They have used manned 
aircraft for decades in their public safety missions, but fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters 
are prohibitively expensive and very few departments can afford their high purchase and 
operating costs.1  
Currently, however, the use of small-unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS), which 
are known by many acronyms but most commonly called drones, is on the rise. These 
devices are used with increasing frequency by private hobbyists and commercial 
operators to record aerial video and photographs, and they are available for minimal 
expense. Their use by American law enforcement agencies is no longer an emerging 
issue, but while police and sheriff’s departments seem to be adopting these tools ever 
more rapidly, their use is not yet commonplace. The idea of American law enforcement 
agencies flying these small, quiet, and inexpensive devices over this nation’s 
neighborhoods still stirs controversy in many communities. That controversy may vary 
from place to place, but is frequently stirred by concerns about erosions of privacy rights 
and the use of drones for warrantless, pervasive surveillance. While the use of drones for 
aerial surveillance may often be legal, it may not be acceptable to the public, and the 
police need the public’s trust to serve them effectively. 
How then, can a local law enforcement agency earn the trust and support of its 
community for the use of drones in support of public safety? A number of organizations 
have addressed the issues of police legitimacy and community trust of law enforcement. 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP), and Community Oriented Policing Office of the United States Department 
                                                 
1 Ron Chambers, “Policing’s New Eye in the Sky: The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Law 
Enforcement,” Journal of California Law Enforcement 40, no. 3 (2006): 7–14. 
 xvi
of Justice (USDOJ) have even produced drone-specific guidelines with recommendations 
for how the police can earn the public’s trust for their use of unmanned aircraft.2  
This thesis uses a structured and systematic multicase study to facilitate a 
comparative analysis of five agencies as a way to answer whether the guidelines 
produced by the aforementioned organizations are effective methods for law enforcement 
agencies to follow in their pursuit of community trust for a beneficial but controversial 
technology. The thesis studies four municipal police departments and one county sheriff’s 
office from the western United States that implemented, or tried to implement, drone 
programs between 2010 and 2016. The goal of the research is to study the situations and 
methods of the agencies in their drone adoption processes to determine what factors led 
to the agency’s success or failure in implementing an operational drone program.  
The research shows that three of the agencies succeeded in adopting and 
operationalizing drones in their public safety missions while one failed completely and 
another has faced major hurdles and delays, but has now obtained city council approval 
to start a pilot program with drones. The thesis showed a strong correlation between the 
community engagement efforts recommended by the IACP and USDOJ with an agency’s 
success in earning community support for a law enforcement drone program. The 
research was inconclusive about the influence of other factors, like crime rates, a 
community’s political affiliation and demographics, and the preexisting conditions of 
trust between a police agency and its constituents. Based on the findings, the author 
provides the following recommendations for law enforcement leaders seeking to adopt 
drones in their jurisdictions. 
                                                 
2 “Domestic Drones,” American Civil Liberties Union, accessed October 7, 2016, https://www. 
aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/domestic-drones; International Association of 
Chiefs of Police, Aviation Committee, Recommended Guidelines for the Use of Unmanned Aircraft 
(Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2012), http://www.theiacp.org/por 
tals/0/pdfs/IACP_UAGuidelines.pdf; and Maria Valdovinos, James Specht, and Jennifer Zeunik, 
Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Guidelines to Enhance Community Trust 
(Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2016), https://ric-zai-inc.com/ric. 
php?page=detail&id=COPS-W0822. 
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 Begin with a Needs Assessment: Before a law enforcement leader or 
agency allocates funds or applies for grants to buy an unmanned aircraft, 
identify which community needs the equipment will meet. 
 Create an Engagement Plan: Work with available resources, including 
marketing or outreach specialists, to create an engagement plan tailored to 
the unique community and agency needs.  
 Inform and Involve the Jurisdiction’s Elected Leaders: Law 
enforcement leaders trying to adopt a drone program should respect their 
city council or county supervisors by involving them even before 
beginning outreach to the community.  
 Implement the Engagement Plan/Develop Policy: Take the 
communities’ input seriously, and if the feedback indicates they do not 
want or need a drone program, be prepared to either continue working on 
earning their support or cancel the program. A technology program is not 
more valuable than the trust of the population.  
 Program Implementation: Now that the public has been engaged, their 
input taken and folded it into the local policy and program, it is possible to 
work on funding, staffing, and training for the UAS program.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Local law enforcement agencies have been using manned aircraft for decades in 
an effort to enhance their public safety and homeland security missions and few in the 
law enforcement profession would dispute the safety and efficiency benefits of having an 
eye in the sky.1  
Police helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft have provided critical tactical and 
decision-making advantages to officers on the ground in a wide variety of circumstances, 
from the pursuit of fleeing criminals to search and rescue or crime scene mapping. 
Unfortunately, very few police agencies can afford the high cost of operating a traditional 
helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft. In fact, a Rotor and Wing article from July 2008 quoted 
a United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) official who stated that fewer than 300 of 
the approximately 19,000 law enforcement agencies across the country operate aviation 
units.2  
Now, however, remotely piloted aircraft offer similar benefits as manned aviation 
with significantly lower cost, reduced maintenance and training time, and greater 
operational flexibility than possible with manned aircraft. They stand to improve public 
safety, making officers’ jobs safer and more efficient.3 The public and media more 
commonly call these small-unmanned aircraft, like their larger “UAS” cousins used by 
the military and federal government systems, “drones.” Their adoption for law 
enforcement missions would seem to be a logical and simple matter were it not for a 
number of challenges in earning the public’s trust for using this new technology in police 
work.  
                                                 
1 Ron Chambers, “Policing’s New Eye in the Sky: The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Law 
Enforcement,” Journal of California Law Enforcement 40, no. 3 (2006): 7–14. 
2 Ramon Lopez, “Unmanned Aircraft in Demand by Law Enforcement,” Rotor & Wing, July 2008. 
3 Paul Shultz, “The Future Is Here: Technology in Police Departments,” Police Chief 75, no. 6 (June 
2008): 20–25. 
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While many recognize the advantages unmanned aircraft offer to law 
enforcement, some see widespread police use of the technology as a serious threat to their 
privacy rights.4 The fact that small drones are so much less expensive than conventional 
fixed wing aircraft or helicopters may lead many law enforcement agencies across the 
nation to use this technology and enable widespread surveillance of the American people. 
The thought of the widespread drone use by police departments nationwide raises 
understandable fears of misuse and invasions of privacy as Americans go about their 
daily activities. American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) writer Jay Stanly has given 
voice to his organization’s concerns when he said that law enforcement drones have the 
“very real potential for becoming a tool for mass surveillance.”5 These concerns come at 
a time when the narrative about policing in America is frequently focused on abuses of 
authority and a public mistrust of law enforcement institutions in the wake of numerous 
high profile use-of-force cases against minorities.6 The problem for law enforcement 
agencies is finding a way to use potentially beneficial, but controversial drone technology 
with the support and trust of their communities. 
A great deal of literature is available on the benefits of unmanned aircraft 
technology for law enforcement, and diverse organizations like the ACLU, the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and the USDOJ have produced 
guidelines for police and sheriff’s departments to follow as they look to add the 
capabilities offered by drones.7 It is broadly agreed upon in these sources that drones may 
soon become “airborne partners” for this nation’s law enforcement officers, but it cannot 
                                                 
4 Maria Valdovinos, James Specht, and Jennifer Zeunik, Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS): Guidelines to Enhance Community Trust (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 2016), https://ric-zai-inc.com/ric.php?page=detail&id=COPS-W0822. 
5 Robb Jeffries, “Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised at Unmanned Aircraft Summit,” McClatchy—
Tribune Business News, June 1, 2013, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1357188101/ 
abstract/AEE0F6214C9C452EPQ/8. 
6 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015), http://cops. 
usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf. 
7 “Domestic Drones,” American Civil Liberties Union, accessed July 23, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/ 
issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/domestic-sUAS; International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, Aviation Committee, Recommended Guidelines for the Use of Unmanned Aircraft (Alexandria, VA: 
International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2012), http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/IACP_UAGuide 
lines.pdf; Valdovinos, Specht, and Zeunik, Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). 
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happen unless American citizens trust that the police are using the devices for their 
benefit.8 This scenario was borne out in Seattle when the city’s police department was 
forced to cancel its fledgling drone program due to community members’ outcry over 
privacy concerns.9 The primary research question of this thesis, which is covered in 
greater detail later, is whether the recommendations by the groups previously mentioned 
are valid and reliable methods for law enforcement leaders to follow in earning public 
trust for the use of drones by the police. 
B. 21ST CENTURY POLICING AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR 
POLICE DRONE USE 
If the American public can both benefit from and be threatened by law 
enforcement’s use of drones, the challenge for police, sheriff’s departments, and 
communities is to find a way to adopt the technology wisely. Agencies and communities 
should use technology to improve public safety and policing services and enhance the 
community’s trust in law enforcement and the legitimacy of the police.10 The executive 
summary of the Final Report by The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
states, “Trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve is 
essential in a democracy. It is key to the stability of our communities, the integrity of our 
criminal justice system, and the safe and effective delivery of policing services.”11  
This task force was formed in reaction to the many recent examples of 
communities suffering an environment of mistrust between law enforcement agencies and 
some of the people they serve. In the wake of high profile and controversial uses of force 
across the nation, many seemingly focused at African Americans or other people of color, 
the work by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing is perhaps the most 
comprehensive source about the value of building cooperative and trusting relationships 
between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve.  
                                                 
8 Valdovinos, Specht, and Zeunik, Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). 
9 Christine Clarridge, “Seattle Grounds Police Drone Program,” Seattle Times, February 7, 2013, 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-grounds-police-drone-program/. 
10 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing. 
11 Ibid. 
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The Task Force’s final report, while not directly related to the use of drones or 
privacy issues, points to the origins and benefits of police legitimacy and community 
trust. The report documents recommendations in six areas, or pillars: building trust and 
legitimacy, policy and oversight, technology and social media, community policing and 
crime reduction, officer training and education, and officer safety and wellness.12 
Although the report does not make drone-specific recommendations, the broader subjects 
it covers are foundational to building and maintaining a trusting relationship between the 
police and their communities and to law enforcement’s adoption of controversial 
technology.13  
The first pillar in the Task Force’s report is about building trust and legitimacy 
between the police and citizens. The Task Force noted that even though law enforcement 
agencies have become better equipped and more effective over the last 20 years, the 
public’s confidence in the police has either stayed flat or even declined. The Task Force 
drew from the conclusions in an article titled “Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic 
Review” to opine that the public is more likely to trust and view as legitimate those 
officials who follow the practices of procedural justice: 
 Treat people with dignity and respect. 
 Give people a voice. 
 Be neutral and transparent in decision-making. 
 Demonstrate trustworthy motives.14 
The second pillar of the report builds on the legitimacy building practices of the 
first pillar by noting that law enforcement policies must be reflective of community 
                                                 
12 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.; Lorraine Mazerolle et al., “Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic Review,” The Campbell 
Collection Library of Systematic Reviews 9 (January 2013), https://www.campbellcollaboration.org/library/ 
legitimacy-in-policing-a-systematic-review.html.  
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values, publicly available and clearly articulated, and transparently implemented.15 By 
maintaining these principles, agencies can practice the tenets of procedural justice and 
improve their services by building trust with their communities. The third pillar in the 
report addresses law enforcement’s use of technology and social media, noting that the 
use of devices like body-worn cameras, unmanned aircraft, and social media, are 
outpacing the laws and regulations governing the technology.16 The report notes that 
technology can bring both benefits and risks for law enforcement agencies in their public 
safety and crime fighting missions. It recommends that officials use advances in 
technology to build on and improve policing practices and community trust. To do so, 
officials should “engage and educate communities” in a transparent dialogue about the 
costs and benefits, potential privacy risks, and accountability measures associated with 
new technology programs.17 The work by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing drew from many sources, and complements the more specific recommendations 
that both preceded and followed it about implementing law enforcement drone programs. 
The ACLU published a report in 2011 outlining the organization’s stance on the 
use of drones by government. The report, titled “Protecting Privacy from Aerial 
Surveillance,” covers the capabilities of the technology now and as it may be in the 
future. It also details the organization’s concerns over the erosion of privacy rights with 
the use of drone technology and ends with recommendations for their use by government 
agencies. The report calls for: 
 Regulations restricting the use of drones for mass surveillance and 
requiring a warrant based on probable cause before the use of the device to 
collect evidence related to a specific criminal act; 
 Restrictions on the retention and use of images collected by aerial 
surveillance technology; 
                                                 
15 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 




 Explicit and publicly available written policies and procedures for the use 
of drones or other aerial surveillance technology;  
 Democratically controlled deployment and policy decisions made based 
on open information rather than the police departments and their policies;  
 Measures to audit the accountability processes and effectiveness of drones 
used by the government.18  
In August 2012, the IACP published a set of recommended guidelines for the use 
of unmanned aircraft by law enforcement agencies. These recommendations differed 
from the ACLU’s partially because the ACLU preferred to regulate the use of law 
enforcement drones in the law while the IACP discussed setting restrictions in individual 
agency policies. The following section from the IACP Recommended Guidelines 
concluded as follows: 
 Law enforcement agencies desiring to use drones should first determine 
how they would use this technology, including the costs and benefits to be 
gained.  
 The agency should then engage its community early in the planning 
process, including its governing body and civil liberties advocates.  
 The agency should assure the community that it values the protections 
provided citizens by the U.S. Constitution. Further, that the agency plans 
to operate the aircraft in full compliance with the mandates of the 
Constitution, federal, state, and local law governing search and seizure.  
 The community should be provided an opportunity to review and 
comment on agency procedures as they are being drafted. Where 
                                                 
18 Jay Stanley and Catherine Crump, Protecting Privacy from Aerial Surveillance (New York: 
American Civil Liberties Union, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/protecting 
privacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf. 
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appropriate, recommendations should be considered for adoption in the 
policy.  
 As with the community, the news media should be brought into the 
process early in its development.19  
The IACP guidelines also contain recommendations about accountability 
processes, noting that all flights should be approved by a supervisor and only for 
authorized or legitimate law enforcement purposes, along with providing suggestions for 
the documentation of flights, retention of images, and flight crew requirements.20  
The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office at the USDOJ 
expanded on the IACP’s recommendations in its 2016 document, Community Policing & 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Guidelines to Enhance Community Trust.21 The 
COPS Office document built on the ideas presented by the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing and applied those concepts to the implementation of law enforcement 
unmanned aircraft programs. The COPS Office document took the community 
engagement processes discussed by the ACLU and IACP and explained how the practices 
they recommend bring benefits beyond just the public acceptance of an unmanned 
aircraft program. Instead, the report identified the processes as a way to use the 
implementation of a controversial technology to build trust and enhance community-
policing practices to benefit agencies and the public more broadly. Its recommendations 
complemented those of the IACP and focused on the following concepts: 
 Conduct outreach efforts early and often in the adoption process. 
 Seek stakeholder engagement proactively using a multitude of resources 
including: 
 Social media 
                                                 
19 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Aviation Committee, Recommended Guidelines for 
the Use of Unmanned Aircraft. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Valdovinos, Specht, and Zeunik, Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). 
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 Community presentations 
 Surveys 
 Citizens’ police academies 
 Traditional media outlets 
 Focus groups 
 City council or other public meetings 
 Use of community volunteers in the program’s development and 
operation 
 Demonstrate how the agency will protect citizens’ privacy rights. 
 Convince the community of the public safety benefit drones will provide. 
 Explain how the agency will maintain safety when operating the devices. 
 Explain the uses and restrictions of the agency’s drones. 
 Reassure the public about the agency’s accountability processes. 
 Maintain the program’s transparency after the initial implementation.22 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While it can be assumed that police and sheriff’s departments should follow the 
established community engagement and trust building recommendations for drone 
program implementation if they want to adopt this controversial technology without 
damaging their relationships with the communities they serve, research for this thesis did 
not find any studies documenting the relationship between the recommendations and 
successful drone adoption efforts. By identifying law enforcement agencies that have 
tried to implement drone programs and studying whether they followed those 
recommended processes, this thesis attempts to answer the following research questions:  
                                                 
22 Valdovinos, Specht, and Zeunik, Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). 
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 Are the UAS adoption guidelines published by the IACP and USDOJ 
reliable processes to help local law enforcement agencies earn their 
communities’ support for the use of drones in policing missions? 
 Did the agencies studied have the trust of their communities when they 
tried to adopt drone technology, and did that pre-existing situation 
influence community acceptance of police drone use? 
 Did the demographics, crime rate, or political preferences of the 
jurisdictions sampled impact the community support for law 
enforcement’s drone use? 
The answers to these questions can serve as a guide to help law enforcement agencies 
looking to improve their services through the adoption of drones or other controversial 
technology by showing how to maintain their communities’ support for their efforts.  
D. CASE SELECTION 
The agencies selected for analysis by this thesis are the Seattle Police Department 
(SPD), the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office (ACSO) in northern California, the San Jose 
Police Department (SJPD), also in northern California, the Arlington, Texas Police 
Department (APD), and the Modesto, California Police Department (MPD). These 
agencies have all added drone programs, or tried to, within the last seven years, which 
means their experiences are recent enough to remain relevant and also well documented 
in existing literature.  
The samples selected are all mid-sized or large agencies in the western United 
States, and with the exception of the ACSO, are all municipal law enforcement agencies 
serving urban and suburban populations. The ACSO is distinct in that its leader is elected 
by the people rather than appointed by a city manager or city council. It serves rural 
areas, but also operates in large population centers in the San Francisco Bay Area, which 
makes it similar to the other sample agencies.  
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Finally, the sample agencies are selected because they provide differentiation in 
the outcome of their drone adoption efforts. Some of the departments have succeeded in 
creating operational programs, with department staff flying the devices on law 
enforcement missions. Others have been forced to delay or abandon their efforts based at 
least in part on the public reaction to the agencies’ use of drones.  
Although more U.S. police and sheriff’s departments have adopted or are in the 
process of adopting drone technology, the sample in this thesis is limited to the five 
agencies as a way to keep from expanding the scope of document too broadly.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The next chapter provides a review of the current literature surrounding the use of 
drones in law enforcement missions in the United States, including the technologies 
benefits and limitations, privacy concerns associated with aerial surveillance, and the 
legal framework agencies within which they must operate. In the examination of the 
legalities of law enforcement drone use, the literature review covers relevant statutory 
and case law, along with the regulatory structure put in place by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). It also includes an analysis of the current case law and how it may 
impact drone operations in future court decisions.  
Chapter III presents the research process and hypotheses, along with the 
recommendations tested in this thesis. Chapter IV is a series of case studies analyzing the 
drone implementation efforts of five sample agencies from Washington, California, and 
Texas. Chapter V presents a comparative analysis. Finally, Chapter VI concludes the 
thesis with a review of the issues and findings, recommendations for agencies looking to 
adopt their own drone programs, and comments about areas for future study.  
An important caveat of this thesis involves the language law enforcement 
employs when discussing small-unmanned aircraft. Many sources refer to the devices as 
UAS, UAV, or sUAS. Some of the sources used in this thesis avoid the use of the word 
“drone,” perhaps because of a perceived negative association with the military’s use of 
the devices as a weapon in the Global War on Terror. Despite these agencies’ use of more 
official-sounding names or abbreviations for the devices, the public and media almost 
 11
universally refer to them as drones. The public has embraced the use of the devices for 
recreational and commercial purposes, and “drone” has become the title by which they 
are known. Government is unlikely to convince the public to begin using “sUAS” or 
“unmanned aerial vehicle” in place of the more popular title, and the author believes that 
the word drone should not be shied away from or feared. In fact, some stakeholders 
outside the law enforcement profession have viewed the use of terms like sUAS or UAV 
to be euphemisms meant to mask the real topic of conversation. This thesis primarily 
refers to the devices by their widely recognized moniker, or drones.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review relies on a variety of sources including government 
documents, journal articles, case law decisions, news articles, trade journal articles and 
blogs, or documents from industry experts and civil liberties advocates. The review 
covers three general topics: the applications for drones in law enforcement service, 
privacy concerns and recommendations for implementation, and the current legal 
landscape.  
A. APPLICATIONS AND BENEFITS OF DRONES IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 
One area of broad agreement among the diverse set of authors writing about law 
enforcement’s use of drones is that the technology offers many beneficial capabilities to 
agencies tasked with protecting the public, enforcing the law, and investigating crime. 
Even the ACLU has acknowledged their utility in missions like search and rescue, 
mapping, and more.23 Many of the articles describing the utility of drones in law 
enforcement are found in trade journals and were chosen because of the perspective and 
expertise they bring to the topic. For example, in the June 2008 issue of Police Chief 
magazine, Paul Schultz outlines how drones stand to improve public safety, make 
officers’ jobs safer and more efficient, and do so at a cost far lower than that of manned 
aviation systems.24  
A number of other authors and publications also weigh in on the beneficial uses of 
unmanned aircraft for law enforcement missions, including Ron Chambers in the Journal 
of California Law Enforcement, and Brett Davis and Don Roby for another issue of 
Police Chief magazine.25 Davis and Roby write that the drone technology currently 
available to law enforcement agencies allows them to complete a wide range of 
                                                 
23 “Domestic Drones.” 
24 Shultz, “The Future Is Here: Technology in Police Departments.” 
25 Chambers, “Policing’s New Eye in the Sky.” 
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surveillance missions to protect the public, first responders, and critical infrastructure.26 
These authors identify many potential missions for police drones, including high-risk 
search and arrest warrants, barricaded subject incidents, mass-casualty attacks, criminal 
investigations, crime scene documentation and reconstruction, search-and-rescue 
operations, post-disaster damage assessment, and fire suppression.27  
B. PRIVACY CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Substantial literature details the privacy concerns and public trust challenges that 
come with law enforcement’s use of drone technology. These sources tend to represent 
two opposing views or spectrums of concern. At one end of the spectrum are authors who 
view the use of drones by police departments as a clear threat to this nation’s Fourth 
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Some authors, however, 
believe those concerns are overstated and posit that few valid concerns exist when it 
comes to the police using unmanned aircraft to observe people and property. Many of the 
sources addressing this topic also provide recommendations for steps police agencies can 
take to overcome or at least mitigate the privacy concerns and trust issues.  
Authors like Saby Ghoshray, who wrote an article in the Northern Illinois 
University Law Review, represent the view of those who fear the privacy threats posed by 
police drones. Ghoshray paints an extreme view of a post-modern America in which fears 
over threats to this country’s national and individual security trump individual privacy 
rights.28 Ghoshray constructed his argument by examining the post-9/11 environment as 
the factor that allows law enforcement and security concerns to supersede individual 
privacy rights. He describes the pervasive surveillance and armed strike capabilities of 
government drones and stresses the importance of the Fourth Amendment as a bulwark 
against the “drone culture.”29 
                                                 
26 Brett Davis and Don Roby, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: All the Boxes Checked, but Challenges 
Remain,” Police Chief 80, no. 6 (June 2013): 60–63. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Saby Ghoshray, “Domestic Surveillance via SUAS: Looking through the Lens of the Fourth 
Amendment,” Northern Illinois University Law Review 33, no. 3 (579). 
29 Ibid. 
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Other sources supporting the idea that the police use of drones endangers U.S. 
Fourth Amendment rights are less dire than Ghoshray, but also discuss the potential for 
Constitutional violations when law enforcement officers fly drones with sophisticated 
surveillance cameras that observe places and activities often considered private. The 
ACLU, for example, has staked out a clear and strong position in its writings on police 
drones. In “Domestic Drones,” the ACLU acknowledges some beneficial public safety 
uses for unmanned aircraft, but also notes that they could cause “unprecedented invasions 
of our privacy rights.”30 The organization recommends a number of privacy safeguards in 
the areas of operational limitations, data retention, policy development, accountability, 
and weaponization.31 Kaveh Waddell’s 2015 article on privacy limitations and the use of 
police drones further clarifies the ACLU position. Waddell quotes ACLU writer Jay 
Stanly as saying that law enforcement drones have the “very real potential for becoming a 
tool for mass surveillance,” particularly if they are equipped in the future with 
sophisticated technologies not yet in widespread use by law enforcement.32 
At the other end of the privacy spectrum are authors like Rosenzweig et al. who 
argue that few Constitutional limits currently exist concerning the use of drones by law 
enforcement in the United States.33 Rosenzweig and his co-authors present a brief 
analysis of relevant Fourth Amendment case law and conclude that legal limits on police 
drone use should come from policy and statutes rather than Constitutional restrictions.34 
They also note that the use of drones for law enforcement missions should have “sensible 
and minimal restrictions.”35  
                                                 
30 “Domestic Drones.” 
31 Ibid. 
32 Kaveh Waddell, “Few Privacy Limitations Exist on How Police Use Drones,” in National Journal 
Daily A.M. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Media, Inc., 2015), http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ 
docview/1651959704/abstract/1E749A1C41384394PQ/61. 
33 Paul Rosenzweig et al., Drones in U.S. Airspace: Principles for Governance (Washington, DC: The 
Heritage Foundation, September 20, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/drones-us-airspace-
principles-governance. 
34 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing. 
35 Rosenzweig et al., Drones in U.S. Airspace. 
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This view is supported by Gregory McNeal’s article, “Drones and Aerial 
Surveillance: Considerations for Legislators,” published by the Brookings Institution. 
McNeal presents a balanced view that examines the use of unmanned aircraft as aerial 
observation platforms for the police, along with the common arguments against that 
use.36 His analysis includes the reasons that sUAS stoke public fears of pervasive 
government surveillance along with information on case law, legislative solutions, and 
recommendations for legislators looking to promote small drones as a beneficial tool for 
law enforcement while protecting this nation’s constitutional rights.37 Both McNeal and 
Rosenzweig reject the arguments put forth by the ACLU and others that search warrants 
should be required for law enforcement drone missions, saying that the proposed solution 
unreasonably restricts the beneficial use of drone technology without preventing the harm 
privacy advocates fear.38 
A number of sources present recommendations on how law enforcement agencies 
can operate drones in a way that preserves privacy rights and garners public trust. While 
the ACLU has issued calls for laws restricting law enforcement’s use of drones, the IACP 
has crafted guidelines for agencies looking to implement drone technology. The IACP 
recognizes both the beneficial uses of drones for law enforcement missions and the 
public’s concerns over potential invasions of privacy. In their 2012 guidelines for the use 
of unmanned aircraft, the group provides recommendations for community engagement, 
policy development, data retention, and accountability that closely resemble those of 
privacy advocates.39 
C. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
The privacy concerns detailed in the previous section led to a review of the 
current state of the law for police use of unmanned aircraft. This review included a look 
                                                 
36 Gregory S. McNeal, “Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for Legislators,” Brookings 
Institution: The Robots Are Coming: The Project on Civilian Robotics, 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2523041. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., Rosenzweig et al., Drones in U.S. Airspace. 
39 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Aviation Committee, Recommended Guidelines for 
the Use of Unmanned Aircraft. 
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at the relevant case law decisions from the United States Supreme Court as a way to 
determine how courts may rule on future cases involving drones. It also included a study 
of federal aviation regulations that apply to small-unmanned aircraft and how those 
regulations might influence or intersect with Fourth Amendment decisions by the courts. 
Finally, the review of the legal landscape included efforts by state legislatures to limit 
law enforcement’s use of drones as a way to address privacy concerns. 
1. Case Law 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a number of rulings dating back to 
1967 relevant to the Fourth Amendment implications of using unmanned aircraft to 
observe people or property on the ground. Perhaps the foundational case in this area was 
the first, that of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). This case is useful to this 
review because it set the modern standard for privacy rulings. After the ruling in Katz v. 
United States, a trespass was no longer required to invoke a citizen’s Fourth Amendment 
rights. Instead, only a subjective expectation of privacy by the citizen was required, as 
well as an acceptance by society (as determined by the courts) that the expectation of 
privacy was reasonable.40 This two-prong test was used in at least five later Fourth 
Amendment rulings, some of which were directly related to the admissibility of aerial 
surveillance by law enforcement. 
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided the case of California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207. In this case, the Justices ruled that the naked-eye observations of law enforcement 
officers overflying a citizen’s property in a fixed-wing aircraft at 1,000 feet were not a 
violation of the respondent’s Constitutional rights and did not require a search warrant.41 
The case brief on the Cornell University Law School’s website quotes the Justices in their 
ruling when they noted, “Any member of the public flying in this airspace who cared to 
glance down could have seen everything that the officers observed. The Fourth 
                                                 
40 “Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967),” accessed October 11, 2016, https://supreme.justia. 
com/cases/federal/us/389/347/case.html.  
41 “California v. Ciraolo,” accessed October 10, 2016, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/ 
476/207.  
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Amendment simply does not require police traveling in the public airways at 1,000 feet to 
obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.”42  
Four years later, the Court weighed in on another case involving observations by 
airborne law enforcement officers in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445. This case was 
remarkably similar to Ciraolo, except the officers in Riley made their naked-eye 
observations from a helicopter at 400 feet over Riley’s property. The Court in this case 
applied both Katz’ two-prong test and the logic they used in deciding Ciraolo. An 
important factor in this case was the Justices’ reliance on FAA regulations and definitions 
of public airspace to determine the admissibility of the officer’s search.43 
The use of drones eliminates the possibility of a naked-eye observation, but the 
Court has also ruled on the legality of aerial surveillance with high-tech surveillance 
systems in the case of Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). According to 
Diane Skalak’s analysis of the decision in the Pace Law Review, the Court ruled that a 
series of over flights of a Dow Chemical plant in 1977 to take photos with a high-
powered camera were admissible under the Fourth Amendment even though the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did not obtain a search warrant. Skalak refers to 
a Vanderbilt Law Review article called “Recent Developments, Warrantless Aerial 
Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis” to describe how the Court’s rationale in the case 
leads to the per se rule that property visible from the air can never satisfy the Katz Test 
and is therefore not subject to Fourth Amendment protections.44  
Skalak points out that the Justices in the Dow case found the use of the 
technologically advanced camera in the aerial surveillance was not a violation of privacy 
because it was technology commonly available to the public.45 This factor is potentially 
important in future rulings on the admissibility of law enforcement’s use of drones 
                                                 
42 “California v. Ciraolo,” Legal Information Institute, accessed October 10, 2016, https://www.law. 
cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/476/207. 
43 Florida v. Riley, 488 US 445 (Supreme Court 1988). 
44 Diane Skalak, “Dow Chemical Co. v. United States: Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth 
Amendment,” Pace Environmental Law Review 3, no. 2 (1986): 277–96. 
45 “Dow Chemical Co. v. United States 476 U.S. 227 (1986),” Justia, accessed October 30, 2016, 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/476/227/case.html.  
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because many authors have pointed out that the technology is gaining widespread 
acceptance by private citizens, businesses, and government.46  
The last case reviewed is the earliest of the relevant rulings issued by the Supreme 
Court, and one that brings more ambiguity to the precedents set in later rulings. The 1946 
case of United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, was not a Fourth Amendment case, but 
could be especially instructive in determining the constitutionality of law enforcement 
drone use because it dealt with low altitude airspace rights and the ability of a private 
citizen to claim the airspace over his property for the purpose of excluding governmental 
trespass by aircraft. 47 In this case, a farmer named Causby sued the government because 
military aircraft were flying over his property at an altitude as low as 83 feet, infringing 
on his use and enjoyment of his home and land.48 The Court in Causby determined that 
citizens have the right to control the airspace over their property at least as high as they 
can occupy or use. Any flights into that airspace could constitute a trespass, but the exact 
altitude was left ambiguous. This ambiguity creates an area of debate in the legality of 
law enforcement drone missions.49  
2. Federal Regulations 
The FAA issued new rules in August 2016 for the operation of unmanned aircraft 
in the national airspace. Gregory McNeal writes about the potential impacts of these new 
rules on future Fourth Amendment decisions as judges try to interpret both the 
Constitution and airspace rights based on the aforementioned decisions.50 As an example, 
the FAA regulations specify that small UAS must operate below 400’ above ground 
level, an area that is now publicly navigable airspace, but can also be interpreted based on 
                                                 
46 Cyrus Farivar, “County Sheriff Quietly Expands Drone Fleet to 6, Flown Dozens of Times,” Ars 
Technica, July 2, 2016, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/07/county-sheriff-quietly-expands-drone-
fleet-to-6-flown-dozens-of-times; Michaelle Bond, “Drones a Benefit for Law Enforcement, but Raise 
Concerns,” The Philadelphia Enquirer, August 10, 2015; Donald L. Shinnamon, “Personal Privacy and the 
Use of Small Unmanned Aircraft by Law Enforcement,” Sheriff 64, no. 2 (April 2012): 66–68. 
47 McNeal, “Drones and Aerial Surveillance.” 
48 “United States v. Causby 328 U.S. 256 (1946),” accessed October 22, 2016, https://supreme.justia. 
com/cases/federal/us/328/256/case.html.  
49 Ibid. 
50 McNeal, “Drones and Aerial Surveillance.” 
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the Causby decision as being so low that it may constitute an unreasonable government 
trespass and also an invasion of privacy unless authorized by a search warrant.51 
3. State Legislation 
A number of authors, including Yakabe, McNeal, and Farber, have written on the 
status of legislative efforts in the various states of this nation to limit or regulate law 
enforcement’s use of small UAS. Yakabe’s article offers a detailed look at both the 
policy and legislative environment for the use of drones in the national airspace system 
without specifically focusing on the law enforcement mission. She examines the legal 
and policy restrictions the federal government and a number of states have imposed on 
the operation of both civil and government sUAS, and included a table summarizing 
those states’ efforts.52 
D. CONCLUSION 
As seen, plentiful sources identify the benefits and challenges associated with 
using drones in policing. The relevant case law and legislation has been examined in both 
primary sources and articles to provide an analysis on the impact of the law on the future 
of drone use. Also, a number of articles and papers provide theoretical recommendations 
about how law enforcement agencies can work with their communities to gain public 
acceptance for the use of a controversial new technology like unmanned aircraft.  
Although a number of authors note the fact that many more law enforcement 
agencies are starting to use unmanned aircraft to assist in public safety missions, those 
agencies have had varying degrees of success over the last several years.53 Some articles 
note how the SPD, an early adopter of drone technology, was forced to abandon its 
                                                 
51 McNeal, “Drones and Aerial Surveillance.” 
52 Alison Yakabe, “UAS on Main Street: Policy and Enforcement at the Local Level,” Homeland 
Security Affairs XI (2015), http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1728289863/abstract/ 
D60B574100D7427BPQ/6. 
53 Bond, “Drones a Benefit for Law Enforcement, but Raise Concerns”; Farivar, “County Sheriff 
Quietly Expands Drone Fleet to 6, Flown Dozens of Times.” 
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program in the face of public mistrust, outcry over how the systems were to be used, and 
fears of widespread privacy violations.54 
Missing in the literature was any research examining whether the law 
enforcement agencies that have already tried to implement unmanned aircraft programs 
have followed the recommendations provided in the literature or whether those 
recommended processes were effective in earning public support for drone adoption.  
An unanswered question then seems to be how law enforcement’s community 
engagement and trust-building efforts will influence a community’s willingness to 
tolerate and even support their police or sheriff’s department implementing a beneficial 
but controversial surveillance tool like unmanned aircraft.  
  
                                                 
54 Clarridge, “Seattle Grounds Police Drone Program.” 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
A. RESEARCH PROCESS 
The primary methodology employed by this research is structured and systematic 
case studies that lend themselves to comparative analysis. This method applies the same 
set of research questions, presented previously, to each of the five law enforcement 
agencies in the sample. This type of study can effectively answer the research questions 
while examining contemporary issues in the studied behaviors over which no one has 
control.55 This research method allows for the systematic assessment of patterns or 
variations in a number of variables that may impact each sample agency’s success in 
earning public trust for an unmanned aircraft program. These factors include all 
departments’ pre-existing relationship with their community, the agencies’ community 
engagement efforts, population sizes, demographics, political preferences in the 
community, and crime rates. Therefore, a central focus of the research is aimed at 
assessing what steps these departments (case) took to engage with their community about 
their drone program, and at what stage of the respective programs’ development they 
specifically engaged their relevant populations. A pictorial presentation of the research 
process is presented in Figure 1.  
                                                 




Figure 1.  Graphical Representation of Research Process 
B. HYPOTHESES 
The primary research questions for this thesis involve how local law enforcement 
agencies can earn the support of their communities for the use of drones in policing 
missions. In the years since small-unmanned aircraft first came on the scene as potential 
tools for the police to use in various types of public safety missions, a number of 
organizations have put forth recommendations on how agencies can successfully adopt 
the technology with their communities’ trust and support. Those recommendations, 
discussed in the following section, drove the primary hypothesis tested in this thesis.  
 H1: If law enforcement agencies follow the drone-specific community 
engagement recommendations suggested by the IACP and USDOJ then 
they are more likely to earn public trust and successfully adopt drone 
technology in support of their law enforcement missions. 
The test for this hypothesis involves examining the practices of each of the five 






















or all of the established recommendations and attempting to determine whether those 
agency practices affected the success or failure of their drone programs. 
The second hypothesis is designed to test an assumption that a law enforcement 
agency’s pre-existing relationship with its community plays a critical role in determining 
the success or failure of the agency’s adoption of drones. The hypothesis states: 
 H2: If a law enforcement agency has not previously earned the trust of its 
community then it is less likely to succeed in creating a drone program. 
This hypothesis is tested by examining data to determine whether the sample 
agencies followed the principles published in the final report of the President’s Task 
Force on 21st Century Policing as discussed in Chapter I.  
The third hypothesis tested by this thesis is based on the idea that the crime rate, 
demography, and political preferences in a community impact the community’s 
willingness to support law enforcement’s use of drones.  
 H3: If a community is politically conservative, has a comparatively high 
crime rate and smaller minority population, then it is more likely to 
support law enforcement’s use of drones.  
The test for this complex hypothesis is based on identifying the population 
demographics, political or voting preferences, and crime rates for each of the sample 
communities and assessing whether a relationship exists between those facts and the 
eventual success or failure of the drone implementation efforts of the sample agencies.  
C. WHY ARE THE HYPOTHESES IMPORTANT? 
The hypotheses and research questions of this thesis are selected because the use 
of drones by police and sheriff’s departments is a relatively new phenomenon. Although 
a growing body of law covers the use of the devices, this topic is thus still in a period of 
some uncertainty about both what law enforcement agencies can legally do with drones, 
and more importantly perhaps, what the public will accept. 
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As noted in the literature review, several Supreme Court cases address the 
constitutionality of warrantless aerial surveillance. The Court has defined that search 
warrants are not generally required when law enforcement conducts surveillance from an 
aircraft in publicly navigable airspace, the same way a police officer’s observations are 
not a Fourth Amendment violation when the officer makes them while legally occupying 
a public highway or other public space. As previously suggested, the Court has stated that 
a manned fixed-wing aircraft is in publicly navigable space when it is as low as 1,000 
feet over the ground, and a helicopter above 400 feet.56 The Court has also ruled that an 
officer’s use of high technology, but publicly available camera equipment, does not 
necessarily trigger the Fourth Amendment warrant requirements.57 In another case, the 
Court ruled that manned-aircraft flying low enough, below 83 feet in the case of U.S. v 
Causby, could impact a person’s property use rights enough to constitute a trespass.58  
Case law for police observations from unmanned aircraft remains to be set, but 
now that the FAA has regulated unmanned aircraft and requires them to fly no higher 
than 400 feet over the ground, it can be argued that warrantless observations from a law 
enforcement drone flying between 100 feet and 400 feet over the ground is to be treated 
the same as observations from an airplane or helicopter in public airspace.  
Even if such surveillance is found to be lawful, using drones to observe people on 
the ground can alarm members of the public and possibly damage the relationships 
between the police and those they serve. This difference, between what the Courts rule is 
legal and what the public is prepared to accept, sets the stage for a number of 
organizations to weigh in on issue of what the law enforcement community should do 
when trying to adopt a drone program without infringing on citizens’ constitutional rights 
and damaging their relationships with the people they serve. The answers to the research 
questions and hypotheses presented in this thesis serve as a test of those established 
recommendations and may help guide law enforcement agencies across the country as 
they work to integrate drone technology in their public safety operations.  
                                                 
56 “California v. Ciraolo”; and Florida v. Riley, 488 US. 
57 “Dow Chemical Co. v. United States 476 U.S. 227 (1986).” 
58 “United States v. Causby 328 U.S. 256 (1946).” 
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D. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This thesis does not present new research on the potential applications and 
benefits for unmanned aircraft in the law enforcement or homeland security mission. Nor 
does it suggest how to integrate unmanned aircraft into the national airspace system, or 
what legislative remedies can be implemented either to regulate law enforcement’s use of 
the technology or mitigate privacy concerns. Numerous sources, including Naval 
Postgraduate School theses, have systematically addressed these topics. Moreover, 
assessing these topics would unreasonably increase the scope of this thesis and require 
addressing issues peripheral to the research questions. 
E. DATA SOURCES 
As suggested previously, several Naval Postgraduate School theses cover various 
topics related to law enforcement’s use of drones, along with numerous articles in 
scholarly journals, magazines, newspapers and other media sources. The literature review 
analyzes a number of articles from scholarly journals, as well as articles from periodicals 
and newspapers not peer-reviewed. The literature review also includes information from 
government documents, case law, and legal analyses to examine the current state of the 
law on government’s use of drones and high-technology surveillance equipment.  
The case studies and comparative analysis of this thesis rely heavily on 
information taken from local government documents and printed news reports about the 
sample agencies and their efforts to implement drone programs. Some of the information 
presented in this thesis is also based, partly, on interviews and personal contact with 
representatives of the law enforcement agencies in the sample.59 
F. OUTPUT 
As suggested, the primary goal of this research is to test the effectiveness of 
established recommendations for implementing a controversial technology like small-
unmanned aircraft. By asking the same questions of each sample agency, which has 
                                                 
59 The Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board reviewed the questions posed in 
interviews and determined they did not constitute human subject research. 
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either succeeded or failed in adopting unmanned aviation programs, the empirical 
research allows the thesis to forecast what community engagement and trust-building 
efforts are likely to win over communities skeptical of law enforcement’s desire to use a 
high-tech surveillance technology like drone systems.  
The ultimate aim of this thesis is to provide local government and law 
enforcement leaders with evidence-based recommendations to help them enhance the 
safety and security of their communities with the successful adoption of their own 
unmanned aviation programs. 
G. INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY MATRIX 
The case studies themselves are facilitated by the use of a structured table, as seen 
in Table 1, to present the application of the same set of research questions to each agency. 
Each sample agency is shown in a row and each research question or other relevant 
information appears in a column to help in the comparative analysis. In Chapter V, each 
cell of the table contains the appropriate, agency-specific, answer to the research question 
for that column as a way to facilitate a comparative analysis of the case studies. This 
format allows the reader to view and quickly compare the answers for each research 
question. Finally, the tables in Chapter V are color-coded with green cells to indicate a 
“positive” answer to the research question, and red cells to indicate a “negative” 
response. For the purposes of this thesis, a positive answer is one more likely to result in 
a successful adoption of drone technology to an operational status for law enforcement or 
public safety missions. 
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In summary, this thesis employs the case study method to assess the efforts to 
adopt drone technology by four municipal police departments and one county sheriff’s 
office in the western United States, but in a comparative and systematic way. Case 
studies, in and of themselves, are a very valuable approach to assessing many problems 
but often cannot generate relevant results beyond the specific case in question (i.e., 
idiographic knowledge). This thesis aims to generate nomothetic knowledge that can help 
police forces beyond the specific cases presented in this thesis to ask important questions 
relative to their employment of drones. Those questions may mirror the aforementioned 
research questions and include: 
 How the police can earn their community’s trust and support for their use 
of drones? 
 Are the drone-specific recommendations and guidelines published by the 
ACLU, IACP, and USDOJ a valid way to earn community trust? 
 How much does a police department’s pre-existing relationship with its 
community influence that community’s willingness to support a law 
enforcement drone program? 
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 Do factors unique to each jurisdiction like crime rates, political affiliation, 
and demographics influence the willingness of communities to support 
their police departments’ use of drones? 
Chapter IV presents the story of each sample agency and focuses on the relevant 
data to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses. Chapter V then provides a 
completed version Table 1, along with a comparative analysis of the data and conclusions 
about the validity of the three hypotheses. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT—A CAUTIONARY TALE 
The SPD is the largest of the agencies considered in this thesis, with a sworn 
staffing of 1,264 officers, supervisors, and managers. Although the SPD has more 
officers than the other agencies in the study, Seattle’s population at the time the SPD tried 
to adopt unmanned aircraft was only 626,865, significantly below San Jose’s population 
of 1 million people.60 The city had the highest rate property crimes rate and the second 
highest violent crime rate of the cities studied.61 Politically, the City of Seattle skews 
more liberal than the other agencies in the study, with the results of the 2012 Presidential 
election showing that Seattle residents voted in favor of the Democratic incumbent, 
Barack Obama, over the Republican Nominee, Mitt Romney, by a margin of 69% to 
29%.62  
The story of the SPD’s efforts to adopt an unmanned aircraft program is a 
cautionary tale of how the actions, or omissions, of a law enforcement agency in the area 
of community engagement can be the determining factor in whether or not the agency 
ultimately succeeds or fails with controversial programs. The SPD was the first of the 
sample agencies to acquire unmanned aircraft, using grant funding from the Department 
of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Urban Area Security Initiative to buy two small drones in 
2010. Although they acquired the devices in 2010, the department did not reveal them to 
the public until 2012. The timing of the SPD’s acquisition of drones and its subsequent 
efforts to inform the public about its plans to use the devices coincided with several high-
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profile use-of-force incidents leading to a strained relationship between the police 
department and the people of Seattle.63  
In 2010, the fatal shooting of a person of color, along with other controversial 
SPD uses of force against people of color, resulted in accusations from the community, 
civil rights advocates, and politicians of racial bias and excessive force by the SPD.64 The 
federal government intervened and initiated an investigation by the Civil Rights Office of 
the USDOJ. The investigation found that SPD had “participated in a pattern or practice of 
excessive force that violated the United States Constitution and other federal laws,” and 
in 2012, the police department entered into a settlement agreement to reform its 
practices.65 The SPD’s efforts to eliminate unconstitutional policing ended up being 
overseen by a monitor appointed by the federal court.66 
Against this backdrop of controversy and distrust, the SPD used $82,553 in 
federal grant funding from the DHS’s Urban Areas Security Initiative to purchase two 
small remotely piloted helicopters without the knowledge of the public or Seattle City 
Council.67 A 2012 lawsuit from the Electronic Frontier Foundation led to the first public 
revelation of the SPD’s purchase and application for FAA certification to operate the 
devices.68  
In April 2012, the SPD demonstrated its Draganflyer X6 drones to the media as a 
way to alleviate public concern over the use of the technology by law enforcement.69 
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SPD staff at the demonstration spoke of potential public safety benefits of the devices and 
also noted their understanding of the public’s concerns over privacy threats, saying the 
SPD would work with the community and the ACLU to create a policy that ensured 
privacy protections and strict accountability.70 A few days after the media demonstration, 
SPD Assistant Chief Paul McDonagh gave a presentation to the city council’s Public 
Safety, Civil Rights, and Technology Committee and apologized to council members for 
not keeping them informed about the department’s plans to use unmanned aircraft. The 
Seattle Times covered the hearing and wrote that the SPD had been training to operate the 
devices it acquired two years before, but had not yet drafted policies for how the drones 
would be used.71 Despite Assistant Chief Mcdonagh’s assurances that his department 
would not be using them to “monitor the city,” council members expressed skepticism 
about the program, with one saying that the police department’s failure to engage with 
the community about its drone program “played into people’s worst fears” about the 
government spying on its citizens.72  
The SPD’s plans to use its Draganflyer X6s appeared to be doomed following a 
public meeting in October 2012 to gather public opinion. The meeting, attended by about 
100 people, was raucous. Protesters chanted and shouted so loudly that Assistant Chief 
McDonagh was unable to speak for more than half of the meeting.73 Some of the 
protesters seemed to be upset with the SPD over more than just the issue of unmanned 
aircraft, shouting things like, “We don’t trust you with the weapons you do have.” The 
ACLU of Washington registered its concerns with the SPD proposals, saying the 
proposed uses for the SPD’s drones were too broad and included a “catchall phrase” 
saying the devices could be used in any situations if the operators received permission.74 
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The ACLU representatives opposed a policy as the way to govern law enforcement’s use 
of drones because it could be easily changed, as opposed to the greater public protections 
provided by an ordinance or law.75 The Sky Valley Chronicle urged opposition to 
Seattle’s use of drones and explicitly noted the USDOJ findings about the SPD’s pattern 
or practice of excessive force and unconstitutional policing practices even without the use 
of drones.76 
In the wake of heated criticism by stakeholders in Seattle, the Seattle City Council 
proposed legislation to restrict the ways the SPD could use its drones. The ordinances 
would have prevented the use of unmanned aircraft for general surveillance, specified 
that a search warrant would be required to collect data with the drones barring exigent 
circumstances, and required approval from a lieutenant or higher ranking officer for use 
in those exigent circumstances.77 The day after this legislation was introduced, Seattle’s 
mayor and police chief decided to cancel the program and focus the department’s efforts 
on maintaining the public’s trust. In a statement by Mayor McGinn released in early 
2013, he said, “We agreed that it was time to end the unmanned aerial vehicle program, 
so that SPD can focus its resources on public safety and the community-building work 
that is the department’s priority.”78  
In this case, it is clear that the SPD failed to implement an operational drone 
program successfully. The SPD was an early adopter and did not have the benefit of 
reviewing or using the ACLU, IACP, or USDOJ recommendations on the best practices 
for the adoption of drones. Its community engagement and policy development efforts 
did not meet the standards set in those documents. The SPD did not engage the public 
either early or frequently in the implementation process. It did not involve community 
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stakeholders in policy development, and it was not able to persuade its citizens of the 
technology’s benefits or the agency’s commitment to safeguard constitutional rights. This 
case is the first point of proof for the first hypothesis and shows a correlation between the 
failure to follow the recommended implementation practices and the failure to win 
community support for law enforcement drone use.  
The case of the SPD also seems to confirm hypothesis H2. The agency’s 
relationship with its community was at a low point following several controversial uses 
of force. The SPD’s failure to follow the principles later espoused in the 21st Century 
Policing Report actually led to intervention and oversight by the USDOJ to correct the 
problem. Against that backdrop, and combined with the agency officials’ lack of 
engagement for their drone adoption, the public and elected leaders did not support the 
SPD’s use of drones. 
The SPD serves the most liberal population of the sample agencies, and that 
population’s lack of support for the department’s use of drones doomed the program, 
which supports the idea that a liberal population is less likely to support law 
enforcement’s use of drones. The city of Seattle had the highest property crime rate and 
second highest violent rate among the sample agencies, but did not support the use of 
drones by the police, which contradicted the idea that people living in higher crime areas 
would be more likely to support the police use of drones. Finally, Seattle had the largest 
percentage of white residents in the sample at 69% of the population, but the relative lack 
of minority residents did not seem to result in increased support for the SPD’s use of 
drones.79 These conflicting results indicate that the political climate of a jurisdiction is 
perhaps more important to the success of a law enforcement drone program than the 
crime rate or diversity of the population. 
B. ARLINGTON PD—SETTING THE EXAMPLE 
The police department in Arlington, Texas was the first of the sample agencies to 
field an operational unmanned aircraft program, but actually acquired its systems a year 
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after the SJPD. It is one of three agencies in the sample group to succeed in creating an 
operational drone program. The 638 sworn officers and managers of the APD served a 
population of nearly 371,000 people at the time of the department’s UAS 
implementation. The city sits in the Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington metropolitan area and is 
notably more conservative than the other sampled jurisdictions, with a voter split of 41% 
Democrat and 57% Republican.80 Arlington, Texas ranked third of the five sample 
agencies in both violent and property crime rates.81 
The APD acquired a remotely operated helicopter in 2011 with DHS grant money 
with the goal of assisting local police officers in providing security during Super Bowl 
XLV in February 2011. The device was still owned by the vendor at the time, and the 
APD obtained FAA approval for flying training missions in a defined, unpopulated, area. 
Unlike some of the agencies examined in this thesis, the APD enjoyed broad support for 
its drone program from the city’s elected leaders. The mayor, Robert Cluck, and City 
Councilman Robert Rivera publicly backed the APD’s use of the drone by making 
statements like, “The idea is [to] provide an extra level of public safety for the city of 
Arlington.”82  
Councilman Charlie Parker held a town hall meeting on May 8, 2013 at which he 
discussed the APD’s aviation unit. The aviation unit at that time consisted of one small 
battery operated helicopter purchased with a $100,000 federal grant. Councilman Parker 
highlighted the capability of the drones to conduct search and rescue, assist with fire 
suppression efforts, etc. but noted it was not to be used for general surveillance 
missions.83 
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The APD conducted a broad outreach effort before its drones began flying 
missions for Arlington. It used town hall meetings to share both potential uses for the 
drones and also missions that would be off-limits. Jennifer Casseday-Blair quoted 
Arlington Police Lieutenant Christopher Cook for an article in Fort Worth Magazine, 
“The public appears to support the safe and responsible use of vehicles based upon our 
record of transparency and setting up a standalone web page to detail what our program is 
all about. We really stress our commitment to protecting the privacy rights of all 
individuals and have had extensive conversations about our program.”84  
Arlington’s efforts in establishing one of the earliest successful drone programs 
while earning the community’s trust earned them recognition in the USDOJ COPS 
office’s guide for law enforcement agencies implementing unmanned aircraft programs. 
In that publication, Arlington Police Chief Will Johnson and his staff described many of 
the steps his agency took to adopt a controversial technology with the support and trust of 
their community.85 Chief Johnson said his staff met with “every possible community 
group” to showcase the drones and provide detailed information about how they would 
be used to enhance community safety and officer safety.86 They confronted the public’s 
concerns directly and emphasized the privacy protections in the department’s policies. 
Finally, the APD worked to show how its remotely piloted helicopters could save 
taxpayer money while offering unique capabilities. As Chief Johnson stated, “We 
emphasized price, privacy, regulations and responsible deployment, and we really 
reduced anxiety.”87 
Despite the apparent political and public support for APD’s drone efforts, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation and other civil liberties organizations were not happy 
about Arlington’s deployment of drones. In a continuing effort to earn its community’s 
trust, the APD created a website in 2013 meant to calm the fears of those who saw the 
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APD’s use of unmanned aircraft as a threat to their privacy rights.88 The website featured 
videos of the drones in action and an explanation of their approved uses from Chief 
Johnson.89 In Arlington’s case, the objections of civil libertarians were overcome by the 
agency’s record of transparency and the support of the public and elected leaders. The 
APD began flying its drones operationally in 2013 and is known today as one of the 
leaders and early success stories in law enforcement adoption of the technology.  
The APD’s drone adoption practices set an early standard for other departments to 
follow, and their efforts serve as a second point of proof for the primary hypothesis, H1. 
The department followed practices later codified in IACP and USDOJ recommendations. 
It engaged with its elected leaders and community early and frequently in the adoption 
process, using a variety of outreach methods including community meetings, the internet, 
and traditional media sources to spread its message. It convinced stakeholders of both the 
public benefits from law enforcement’s drone use and the department’s commitment to 
preserve privacy rights and act constitutionally. In the end, its efforts led to public 
support and a successful drone program.  
No evidence indicated that the APD suffered from any pre-existing conditions of 
distrust between the department and the citizens of Arlington, and its efforts in 
undertaking the implementation of a drone program tend to show that the department 
embraces and follows the principles later published by the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing. This data supports hypothesis H2, but is insufficient to draw a strong 
conclusion. 
As the most politically conservative of the sample jurisdictions, Arlington’s 
support for its police department’s use of drones is another point of confirmation for the 
first assumption of hypothesis H3. Arlington has the second least diverse population in 
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the sample, with 59% of the residents estimated to be Caucasian.90 The population 
supported the department’s use of drones, which is a point of confirmation for the second 
assumption of hypothesis H3. The city of Arlington had the third highest crime rate 
among the five sample agencies, and although the public supported the police 
department’s drone program, it is unclear whether the crime rate played a role in that 
support, as assumed in the final part of hypothesis H3. 
C. ALAMEDA COUNTY—A STUDY IN PERSISTENCE AND POLITICAL 
WILL  
The ACSO is unique in this series of case studies because it is the only law 
enforcement agency led by an elected official and the only agency responsible for 
providing law enforcement services beyond the geographic limits of an incorporated city. 
The Sheriff’s Office is responsible for operating the jails in Alameda County, and also 
provides patrol and criminal investigation services in the unincorporated areas of the 
county. In addition, the Sheriff’s Office is under contract to provide law enforcement 
services to the city of Dublin and the Oakland International Airport.91 The ACSO’s 
annual report for 2013 stated that its 950 sworn deputies served a county population of 
over 1.5 million residents. The vast majority of those residents live in cities that receive 
police services from municipal police departments, however, and the 2013 population 
living in the balance of the county is only 143,820.92 The crime rate outside of the 
incorporated cities in Alameda County is relatively low, with the lowest rate of property 
crimes and the second lowest violent crime rate of the sample jurisdictions.93 
The ACSO has established a reputation in the San Francisco Bay Area as a highly 
professional organization. The history page on the ACSO website notes that the agency is 
one of only 13 in the nation to earn the “triple crown” of national accreditation, having 
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earned accreditation from the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement 
Agencies (CALEA), the American Correctional Association, and the National 
Commission on Correctional Health Care/California Medical Association.94 The ACSO 
developed and hosted the Urban Shield Tactical Training Exercise in 2007, and continues 
to host the annual event.95 Urban Shield is a full-scale readiness exercise that brings 
together law enforcement Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, explosive 
ordinance teams, with other first responders to take part in 48 continuous hours of 
scenario-based exercises.96 It was the first exercise of its kind and has been replicated in 
Boston and other cities across the nation.97 The agency also works closely with the San 
Francisco Bay Area Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) to provide regional training in 
the areas of law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services, public health, and 
emergency management.98 
With this background, it is unsurprising that the ACSO would be one of the first 
law enforcement agencies in the state of California to explore the use of unmanned 
aircraft in law enforcement, public safety, and homeland security missions. The agency 
began testing drones in late 2011, and gave a public demonstration of how the technology 
might be employed during the Urban Shield exercise in October 2012.99 In late 2012 and 
early 2013, Sheriff Ahern and his staff planned to use federal grant funding administered 
through the Bay Area UASI to purchase two small quadcopter unmanned aircraft for a 
little over $30,000.100  
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Ahern and his staff tried to bring the issue before the Alameda County Board of 
Supervisors in December 2012, but the ACLU in northern California and the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation successfully lobbied to have the item pulled from the agenda.101 
Sheriff Ahern eventually brought the issue forward at the Board of Supervisors’ Public 
Protection Committee meeting on February 14, 2013. Over 150 residents and civil rights 
advocates attended the acrimonious meeting to express anger and fear at the idea of the 
sheriff’s office conducting surveillance of citizens with drones.102 Some in the audience 
called the idea an “assault on my community,” and showed distrust when Sheriff Ahern 
said the devices would not be used for surveillance.103  
Although Sheriff Ahern and Captain Tom Madigan worked to assure the 
supervisors and community members that the unmanned aircraft would be restricted to 
specific missions like search and rescue, firefighting, bomb-detection, and crime scene 
preservation, privacy advocates like the ACLU’s Linda Lye strongly resisted the Sheriff’s 
acquisition and use of drones. Lye and others accused Sheriff Ahern of trying to acquire 
the technology without public scrutiny.104 In an article Lye published on the ACLU 
website on the day of the Public Protection Committee hearing, she commended Sheriff 
Ahern for his agency’s efforts in drafting a written policy for drone use and committing 
not to use the technology for surveillance, but criticized the proposed policy as falling 
short of the necessary privacy protections.105 She objected to the idea that a drone could 
be deployed for the limited purpose of a search and rescue mission but also record images 
of political protesters during the flight, images Sheriff Ahern could retain and analyze.106  
The Alameda County Board of Supervisors rejected the use of federal grant funds 
to purchase drones for the sheriff’s office, which may have ended the project for 
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Alameda County except for the fact that county sheriffs are elected officials with 
different authorities and chains of command than municipal police chiefs. While county 
supervisors in California approve the sheriff’s budget, they do not generally have the 
authority to control line items in that budget. Additionally, as elected officials, county 
sheriffs are beholden to the voters for their jobs, not county administrators or supervisors.  
In the case of Alameda County, Sheriff Ahern’s staff continued in its quest to start 
an unmanned aircraft program using its own budget. ACSO managers were well aware of 
the recommendations from the ACLU and IACP about best practices for earning 
community support and trust for the use of drones, and met several times with Linda Lye 
and the ACLU to collaborate on policy development following the Public Protection 
Committee hearing on February 14, 2013. Further, the ACSO met with the Alameda 
County District Attorney’s Office, the Alameda County Public Defender’s Office, and 
other groups to gather input on policy issues. Input from the ACLU led directly to 
language changes in the policy concerning the collection of “data” versus pictures and 
video, among other things.107  
One area of disagreement between the ACSO and ACLU covered what deputies 
should do about criminal activity they saw with drones that was unrelated to the original 
purpose for the flight. The ACLU wanted the sheriff’s office to ignore any incidental 
criminal activity they saw, but the ACSO could not agree to that condition.108  
By December 2014, Sheriff Ahern had spent $97,000 from the county budget to 
purchase two drones that would be operated by ACSO employees assigned to the 
County’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Services.109 Linda Lye accused 
Sheriff Ahern of avoiding public scrutiny by buying the drones in secrecy using his own 
budget after the Board of Supervisors failed to approve his request to use grant 
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funding.110 She admitted the ACLU had worked on policy development in early 2013, 
but said the sheriff’s office told her they no longer planned to purchase any drones.111 
Once again, Sheriff Ahern strongly denied Lye’s accusation, noting that his staff had 
reached out to the ACLU and other public groups about his agency’s plans and policy at 
more than 25 events.112 Sheriff Ahern also told reporters he had informed county 
supervisors of his intentions in the months before his agency received the devices.  
Despite the outcry by privacy advocates, the ACSO continued and expanded its 
drone program, and by 2016, the agency had a fleet of six small-unmanned aircraft flown 
by both sworn deputies and citizen volunteers on law enforcement and support missions. 
The use of civilian volunteers as participants in a law enforcement drone program later 
became one of the proposals in the USDOJ COPS Office guidelines on best practices for 
implementing law enforcement unmanned aircraft programs.113 The ACSO staff has 
flown its fleet of drones on approximately 100 missions that ranged from tracking fleeing 
suspects and assisting with search warrants to scouting ahead of law enforcement tactical 
teams searching for an armed suspect who had killed one police officer and wounded 
another.114 The devices have also been used during firefighting efforts and during search 
and rescue operations for missing persons. Alameda County now has perhaps the most 
active unmanned aircraft program in the state, one that serves as a model for other 
agencies, like the Modesto Police Department (MPD), seeking to implement their own 
drone programs.115 In 2016, then-Captain Madigan reported that the public reaction to 
the program since it became operational has been “nothing but positives.”116  
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Although privacy advocates from groups like the ACLU opposed the ACSO’s use 
of drones, the agency has created an operational and successful unmanned aircraft 
program that appears to have the support of the general public. The agency engaged with 
its community before acquiring the devices, and continued to engage regularly with the 
public, civil liberties advocates, and elected leaders. It included a broad range of 
stakeholders, including program critics in the ACLU, in the development of policies. It 
used multiple communication methods to convey the devices’ public safety benefit and 
the accountability measures the agency would use in the program. These practices, along 
with the positive public reaction to the agency’s eventual use of drones in policing, 
demonstrate a third positive correlation to the first hypothesis, H1. 
As with the APD, no evidence was available to show the ACSO’s practices prior 
to or during the drone implementation process led to a pervasive lack of trust between the 
agency and the public. This would tend to show another data point supporting hypothesis 
H2, but without greater control of the variables, it is difficult to draw a conclusion for the 
second hypothesis based on this case study.  
The population in Alameda County is the most liberal of the sample jurisdictions, 
with the lowest percentage of Republican voters and the second highest rate of 
Democratic voters. The fact that this more liberal population supports their sheriff’s 
office using drones tends to disprove the political component of hypothesis H3.117 The 
population of Alameda County is also among the two most diverse in the sample, with 
only 43% of the residents identifying as Caucasian. This population’s support of the 
ACSO’s drone program runs counter to the demographic assumption based on 
Monmouth University’s poll, that a population with a higher population of racial or 
ethnic minorities would be less likely to support law enforcement’s use of drones.118 
Finally, Alameda County has the lowest property crime rate and the second lowest 
violent crime rate in the sample group, which does not support the idea in the third 
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hypothesis that a population living with high crime rates is more likely than one with low 
crime rates to support law enforcement’s use of drones.119  
D. SAN JOSE—FAILURE, PIVOT, AND PROGRESS  
The city of San Jose, California sits at the south end of the San Francisco Bay in 
the heart of the Silicon Valley, a location world famous for high-tech innovation. It is the 
third largest city in California and the largest in the San Francisco Bay Area. Known as 
the capital of Silicon Valley, San Jose residents are used to technological innovation. The 
city and surrounding area is home to scores of innovative technology companies. The city 
skews liberal politically, with only 20% of the registered voters identifying as 
Republicans.120 It had the lowest violent and second lowest property crime rates of the 
jurisdictions in this study.121 
The police department in San Jose did not appear to have the public trust issues 
that the SPD faced when it tried to implement its unmanned aircraft program. In fact, the 
San Jose Police Department (SJPD) had been the example of transparency and inclusion 
when it began researching the use of body-worn cameras (BWC) by police officers in 
early 2014.122 In January of that year, the department formed a committee including 
department employees and community members to examine benefits and concerns with 
the use of BWC technology and to help shape SJPD policy.123 The SJPD posted its 
policy online for public review and created a website to inform the public about the 
program. The SJPD closed its narrative about the project with the statement, “Your 
opinion matters.”124 The SJPD’s efforts to adopt unmanned aircraft technology, however,  
were originally undertaken in “stark contrast” with their body camera implementation 
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process, with far less concern for transparency and impacts to the public’s trust of the 
SJPD.125  
In July 2014, the public learned through documents produced in response to a 
public records act request that the SJPD had quietly purchased an $8,000 unmanned 
aircraft with grant money from the DHS’s Urban Areas Security Initiative.126 The 
documents revealed the SJPD had put a one-line item on the city council’s consent 
agenda in November 2013 to accept $1M in funding from the DHS. The city council did 
not debate the agenda item and no notice was posted about the SJPD’s plans for the 
money.127 
In an article published on July 30, 2014, the ACLU took the position that the 
SJPD never should have gone to the city council to approve DHS funding for a drone 
program without a vigorous public debate and explicit approval by the elected 
representatives of the citizens. One of the ACLU’s complaints was that DHS decisions to 
award UASI grants were made by a group of 11 people who are not accountable to the 
citizenry, and unless individual jurisdictions create a process to ensure transparency, 
accountability, and oversight, the police have too much power to operate 
autonomously.128  
The criticism gained energy, and on August 5, 2014, the San Jose Mercury News 
(San Jose’s local newspaper) published a story noting widespread complaints by civil 
liberties groups and national media about SJPD’s “secretive purchase of a drone.”129 In 
the wake of the public complaints, the SJPD leadership released a statement to the media 
on August 5, 2014 in which they stated the drones, devices also in use by hobbyists, 
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would be used to help bomb technicians safely access and view suspicious devices.130 In 
the media statement, the SJPD leaders also apologized for their procurement process in 
2013.131 The SJPD’s statement read:  
In hindsight, SJPD should have done a better job of communicating the 
purpose and acquisition of the UAS (Unmanned Aerial System) device to 
our community. The community should have the opportunity to provide 
feedback, ask questions, and express their concerns before we move 
forward with this project. To this end, we will first develop a community 
outreach plan before we take steps to deploy the UAS.132 
The SJPD spokesman, Albert Morales, went on to say that the SJPD had no 
specific timetable for conducting community outreach about the program, and that the 
FAA had not yet cleared the SJPD to fly the device.133 The SJPD’s media statement also 
expanded the potential list of uses for its UAS to include situations where lives might be 
in immediate danger, a loose criteria that alarms surveillance critics concerned with 
mission creep and loss of privacy rights as a result of unchecked use of high-tech 
surveillance methods like drones.134  
Documents released by the SJPD and published by the website MuckRock 
showed that Chief Esquivel’s approval for the UAS program required a review by the city 
attorney’s office, adoption of a UAS policy, and public outreach. It appears that outreach 
did not occur before the department acquired its UAS, and it is unclear whether the city 
attorney review ever occurred.135  
Nicole Ozer, the technology and civil liberties policy director for the ACLU of 
California, stated the ACLU’s concerns when she said that the media release by the SJPD 
confirmed her organization’s concerns that the San Jose police intended to expand drone 
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use beyond the mission set they had originally described. Ozer advocated for a debate not 
about what missions the SJPD should plan for its drones but about whether they should 
be allowed to use the devices at all.136 Ozer further stated, “The SJPD seems to definitely 
misunderstand some critical issues related to drones and to me that underscores why there 
should be a public debate so the right kind of information gets out.”137 
By the end of 2014, the SJPD had reversed course and began holding public 
meetings about their fledgling drone program. Members of the SJPD’s leadership 
partnered with the San Jose Neighborhoods Commission, a group chartered by the city to 
“represent neighborhood interests and concerns on matters of public safety, 
transportation, budget, and quality of life in neighborhoods of San Jose,” to hold four 
community meetings to discuss its UAS program between November 2014 and March 
2015.138 At the first of these meetings, the SJPD presented a draft policy for its UAS 
program so the neighborhood commissioners and members of the public in attendance 
could comment on the policy. Over the course of the four meetings, over 200 community 
members attended and participated in the discussions. Additionally, the meetings were 
recorded and uploaded to YouTube, where approximately 600 people viewed at least a 
portion of the recordings.139  
The San Jose Neighborhoods Commission also conducted an online community 
survey to gather public input on the police department’s UAS program. The survey went 
out at the end of 2014, with questions based on the discussions and public comment from 
the first Neighborhoods Commission meeting on the topic in November of that year. The 
survey was advertised at Neighborhoods Commission meetings, at neighborhood 
outreach events, and via e-mail messages sent to community networks across the entire 
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city. It was open for 10 weeks and over 600 people responded.140 Fifty-six percent of the 
respondents favored the SJPD’s use of a drone, and 71% favored the use of drones in 
bomb threat or active shooter incidents. A minority viewed drones as appropriate for 
general surveillance or monitoring protests.141  
Despite these outreach efforts and public assurances of limited and beneficial uses 
of the police department’s drones, some in the community were still wary of local police 
using the technology based on the potential for mission creep and also a perception of 
how drones are used for international warfare.142 
In March 2015, the San Jose Neighborhoods Commission drafted 
recommendations to the San Jose City Council for the consideration and possible 
adoption of the police department’s unmanned aircraft program and associated policies. 
The Neighborhoods Commission recognized and acknowledged public concerns over 
surveillance and personal privacy risks with the use of law enforcement drones, but 
recommended the city council approve the adoption of a pilot program allowing the SJPD 
to operate one drone for a year and only in exigent situations like an active shooter, or in 
support of the department’s bomb disposal unit.143 
The city council accepted the Neighborhoods Commission report in a public 
meeting on March 19, 2015, and authorized the SJPD to implement their pilot UAS 
program in another public city council meeting in August, five months later. The SJPD 
did not expect to receive FAA approval to fly its drone until the end of 2016, and as of 
Spring 2017, it is not yet operational.144  
The case of the SJPD’s drone adoption efforts is useful to this thesis because the 
agency’s initial failure to follow recommended practices seemed to prevent the agency 
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from successfully creating an operational drone program. After that initial failure, 
however, the department began the public debate called for by privacy advocates and 
engaged with the community through meetings, surveys, and social media. It went back 
to its elected leaders at the city council and engaged in public debate at an open meeting 
that resulted in the council’s approval of a pilot program for the SJPD to begin operating 
drones. Although the department’s program has not reached operational status, the 
evidence in this case study seems to validate the primary hypothesis, H1.  
As previously noted, at the time of their drone adoption efforts, the SJPD did not 
appear to have pervasive public trust problems, and the department was recognized for 
the procedurally just and transparent way it undertook the implementation of a BWC 
program for its officers. The fact that the public initially opposed the SJPD’s drone 
program but later approved of it leaves an unclear result for hypothesis H2. It could be 
that the agency’s positive efforts in the past helped it overcome its initial missteps in the 
drone program, but the research does not support a conclusion in this case.  
The research in this case also failed to prove the components of the third 
hypothesis, H3. San Jose is one of the two most diverse communities in the sample, with 
the lowest violent crime and second lowest property crime rates, and the second lowest 
percentage of registered Republicans in the sample, but the SJPD was able to win public 
and city council support once it undertook a public engagement process as outlined in the 
established recommendations by the IACP and USDOJ COPS Office.145 One possible 
conclusion from this case study is that following the engagement and transparency 
processes outlined in recommendations from groups like the IACP and USDOJ is more 
important to the success of a law enforcement drone program than the conditions tested in 
hypothesis H3. 
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E. MODESTO POLICE DEPARTMENT—LEARNING FROM THE 
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF OTHERS 
The City of Modesto sits in California’s Central Valley, 92 miles east of San 
Francisco and 68 miles south of Sacramento. It is surrounded by the rich farmland of 
Stanislaus County and with an estimated 2016 population of just over 212,000 people is 
among the 20 largest cities in California.146 Crime data reported to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) for 2015 showed that the City of Modesto had very high crime rates 
that put the city as the third most dangerous in California.147 Modesto’s political climate 
is the most conservative of the California agencies studied, with Republicans comprising 
38% of the city’s registered voters in 2016, the year Modesto implemented its sUAS 
program.148 The MPD seems to enjoy a generally positive relationship with its 
community, and Lt. Ivan Valencia noted that his department is able to call upon 
community groups like the local chapter of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for their help in maintaining community 
peace and safety during volatile crimes or incidents involving the police.149 
The MPD started looking into the idea of using unmanned aircraft to assist in its 
public safety mission in March 2016.150 As the last of the agencies in this case study to 
implement a drone program, Modesto would seem to have a distinct advantage because it 
could learn from the successes and failures of other law enforcement agencies across the 
country. It also had the advantage of beginning its program after the devices had grown in 
popularity among hobbyists. Finally, the MPD began its program close to the time when 
the FAA was set to release its final regulations for the operation of UAS and integration 
of UAS into the national airspace. Also, organizations like the ACLU and IACP 
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published their recommendations for how law enforcement agencies could adopt UAS 
technology while earning or maintaining community support before Modesto’s 
implementation efforts. With these potential advantages over the early adopter agencies 
included in this study, how did the MPD handle its implementation process? 
The MPD leadership formed a committee of MPD sworn officers and managers to 
research both the benefits drones could bring to their mission, as well as the potential 
disadvantages of implementing this relatively new technology.151 Modesto’s UAS 
Committee determined that implementing an unmanned aviation program would enhance 
the MPD’s mission of protecting lives and property and turned to the next steps in getting 
its program off the ground. The committee met with local aviation officials and was able 
to obtain guidance from the FAA’s law enforcement coordinator on how to navigate the 
process for the certificate of authorization it would need to fly UAS in the national 
airspace system. The committee also met with the MPD command staff and got its 
approval to begin a UAS pilot program.  
Before beginning its own program, Modesto’s UAS committee met with the only 
other agency in the area operating unmanned aircraft team in a law enforcement capacity, 
the ACSO. During that site visit, the committee learned more about the FAA approval 
process and also about some of the UAS available to law enforcement.  
The MPD specifically considered the UAS recommendations by the IACP, 
ACLU, and others in the implementation of its program. The MPD met with community 
stakeholders, including the Police Chief’s Clergy Council, Neighborhood Watch leaders, 
and Business Watch leaders, to educate them on the benefits of drones for law 
enforcement and community safety.152 According to a document from the MPD, all the 
people present favored the program and recognized the community benefit provided by 
the MPD’s drones. The MPD also conducted outreach about the program at community 
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events like National Night Out and a local race called the Peace Officer Memorial Half 
Marathon.153 
The MPD committee presented the concept for the its UAS pilot program to the 
city council’s Great Safe Neighborhoods Committee for review on August 8, 2016.154 In 
Police Chief Galen Carroll’s report to the Great Safe Neighborhoods Committee, he 
noted community concerns about police drones infringing on individual privacy rights 
and stated his department would not use UAS for random surveillance. Carroll instead 
wrote that the department would limit the use of the UAS to specific missions like search 
and rescue and crime scene investigation. Chief Carroll also noted how the department’s 
unmanned aircraft can only fly for about 28 minutes before their batteries need to be 
recharged. Chief Carroll’s report highlighted “extensive research” his department had 
conducted before starting the UAS program, and also stated his desire to bring the 
program before the city council early in the implementation process. In an email 
message, Chief Carroll wrote, “However, given some misunderstanding that occurs with 
unmanned aerial vehicles and their use, I believed it should come in front of the Council. 
The program is not fully implemented. We are in the training stage, which is the very first 
phase required by the FAA.”155 The Great Safe Neighborhoods Committee approved the 
program and the MPD then completed a presentation to the city council itself.  
MPD staff engaged with the community in other ways as well. The day after the 
Great Safe Neighborhood Committee meeting, MPD officials held a technology 
demonstration and answered questions for the media and public in a parking lot at the 
Vintage Faire Mall. Once again, the MPD sought to reassure the public about the purpose 
for and restrictions on its UAS program. Lt. Ivan Valencia told reporters, “The drones 
will not be used for random surveillance. If we’re in open public space where we have 
the right to be anyway, there’s no search warrant required ever, but if we want to fly over 
somebody’s house, yes,” the police would need to get a search warrant to safeguard 
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citizens’ privacy rights.156 Sgt. David Mullins was also on record saying, “This is not a 
secret program. This is not random surveillance. These are directed. You’ll know we’re 
there; no different than if we deploy a canine in an area. You’re going to know the police 
are there and they’re looking for somebody.”157  
The MPD staff publicly delineated when its department policy allows it to use its 
drones. These missions include assisting in the service of search warrants; assisting other 
law enforcement agencies; responding to biological, chemical, or radiological disasters; 
disaster management; crime investigations; search and rescue; civil disturbances; 
dignitary protection; providing increased situational awareness for officers; and 
documenting crime scenes.158 The devices can also be used to search for fleeing criminal 
suspects, much like a police canine, in a way that is safer and more efficient than using 
only human police officers on the ground.  
Those at the demonstration also heard about two recent incidents where 
Modesto’s UAS were able to assist officers with real-world missions.159 In one of the 
examples, officers told how their UAS was able to spot a fleeing robbery suspect for 
ground units and aid in his capture. In another, the MPD was able to fly its UAS to assist 
the county’s water rescue team in assessing a stretch of river it could not access safely.  
One of the local reporters at this technology demonstration event polled 
community members on camera to ask their feelings about the use of UAS technology by 
their police department. Everyone he interviewed supported the department’s use of 
unmanned aircraft in its day-to-day operations.160  
The MPD has used social media to communicate with the public about its UAV 
program as well. In February 2017, the MPD published a video on its Facebook page in 
which Lt. Ivan Valencia showcased how the department’s UAS were being used to assist 
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with emergency planning and management by providing real-time video footage of 
threatened or flooded waterways to police, fire, and emergency management officials.  
The MPD now has five drones assigned to their Patrol and Investigations 
Division, and notes that the devices have been used during perimeter searches, missing 
person investigations, crime scene documentation, emergency management during 
flooding, and at search warrants.161 
The MPD went to great lengths to engage with the public early and often as it 
sought to implement a drone program. It spoke with and listened to a wide range of 
stakeholders and conveyed both the public benefit to law enforcement’s use of drones, as 
well as the MPD’s commitment to upholding the constitutional rights of citizens. The fact 
that the public and elected leaders supported the MPD’s acquisition and use of drones is a 
strong indicator that hypothesis H1 is true. As noted previously, evidence of prior 
community trust or police legitimacy problems with the MPD does not exist, which can 
indicate support for hypothesis H2.  
Modesto, with 38% of its voting residents identifying as Republicans, is the 
second-most conservative jurisdiction in the sample.162 Since the MPD won the trust of 
the community for its drone program, it could be concluded that the conservative makeup 
of the population made it easier for the agency to earn that support. With the MPD’s 
strong engagement efforts, however, it is difficult to isolate the politics of the population 
as a causative factor. The remaining assumptions in H3 gain at least some support from 
the data, since Modesto had the highest violent crime rate and the second highest 
property crime rate in the sample. The city’s population was 50% Caucasian, making it 
the third least diverse jurisdiction in the sample.163 Even though the data tends to support 
the third hypothesis, it is once again difficult to determine with certainty the role the 
factors in this hypothesis played in the MPD’s successful drone program.  
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F. CONCLUSION 
The case studies presented in this thesis have shown how four municipal police 
departments and one county sheriff’s office in the western United States adopted, or tried 
to adopt, unmanned aircraft in support of their law enforcement and public safety 
missions. The agencies were chosen for the timing of their adoption efforts, their 
locations, and the results of their efforts. One agency, the SPD, failed to implement an 
unmanned aircraft program and has since transferred its UAS to the Los Angeles Police 
Department. Three of the other agencies, the APD, ACSO, and MPD, succeeded and are 
now flying their drones on public safety missions. The SJPD initially failed to win 
support for its program, but has since obtained approval to begin a pilot program to 
operate drones. The next chapter provides an analysis of the case studies to test the three 
hypotheses in this thesis and determine what factors led to the success or failure of the 
sample agencies.  
 57
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the research design chapter, the key research component of this 
thesis is a structured and systematic multicase study. This method allows both the 
application of a common set of research questions to multiple cases and the subsequent 
comparative analysis based on the results of the answers to those research questions. It 
also allows the researcher to present the sample agencies, research questions, and 
resulting data in a set of tables so the reader can quickly see the results to identify 
patterns. The first of those tables, showing a look at the overall research, is shown in 
Table 2.  
This chapter begins with a review of the material covered in this thesis, and then 
provides a detailed analysis of each cell in the accompanying research table. It also 
expands on the individual case analyses to identify patterns and trends that lead to 
recommendations in the following chapter for law enforcement agencies wishing to 
implement their own drone program.  
As discussed previously, the challenge of implementing a law enforcement drone 
program goes beyond the question of what is legal into the question of what the public is 
willing to accept from their police. Drones in government service, particularly law 
enforcement, are powerful surveillance tools that raise controversy for many people 
because of their ability to allow privacy intrusions and the erosion of civil rights in the 
United States. The case studies and accompanying analyses in this thesis therefore are 
meant to answer the following primary research questions: 
 Are the UAS adoption guidelines published by the IACP and USDOJ 
reliable processes to help local law enforcement agencies earn their 
communities’ support for the use of drones in policing missions? 
 Did the agencies studied have the trust of their communities when they 
tried to adopt drone technology? 
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 Did the demographics, crime rate, or political preferences of the 
jurisdictions sampled impact the community support for law 
enforcement’s drone use? 
In the previous chapter, the thesis reviewed each of the five sample agency’s 
efforts, their successes, and their failures in their implementation processes. The previous 
chapter also noted how the answers to the research questions for each of the sample 
agencies validated or refuted each of the hypotheses.  
The individual case studies determined whether the sample agencies followed the 
processes outlined in published guidelines from the IACP and the USDOJ COPS Office 
by examining their processes to see if and how they engaged with their communities in 
their efforts to bring unmanned aircraft to policing.  
B. THE TABLE 
Each of the sample agencies is presented in a separate row in the main research 
table, shown in Table 2. The first column shows the name of the agency and the second 
column shows the number of sworn personnel, generally from the rank of police officer 
through police chief, as a way to provide a comparison of the agencies’ size at or near the 
time they began their drone adoption processes. The third column lists the estimated 
population served by each sample agency at or near the time each agency began its drone 
adoption process, once again as a way to help compare the sample agencies’ size and 
scope of service. 
The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh columns provide information about each 
sample jurisdiction’s political preferences, demographics, and crime rates. The data in 
column four comes from either voter registration records or, where those do not exist, 
from voting records in the 2012 Presidential election. The data in column five is taken 
from U.S. Census records, and columns six and seven present information from the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Report. These columns are meant to help answer the research question 
about the impact of politics, demographics, and crime rates on the public’s willingness to 
support law enforcement’s use of drones.  
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Column eight notes the approximate date each agency first acquired drones. The 
information on when each agency acquired drones is important because it shows whether 
they were early adopters or began their processes later, when they had the benefits of 
reviewing and following the established recommendations discussed in Chapter I and 
also learning from the experiences of other agencies. 
Column nine notes any pre-existing conditions of distrust between each agency 
and the community it serves. The data in this column helps answer the second research 
question, and is based on a variety of sources documenting the history and conditions at 
each agency when they acquired drones. The cells in this column are shaded green for 
those agencies with no identifiable community trust issues and red if such problems 
existed. The next column provides information about whether the agencies followed 
practices outlined in the IACP and USDOJ guidelines as they tried to implement their 
drone programs. This column is critical to the thesis research because it tests the primary 
hypothesis. Agencies that followed the recommended practices have cells in this column 
shaded green, while those that did not are shaded red. The SJPD’s cell in the column is 
yellow because the department initially failed to follow the guidelines, but eventually 
adopted the community engagement and trust-building recommendations. 
The last column, on the right of Table 2, answers whether the sample agencies 
have been able to operationalize their drone programs at the time of this thesis’ writing. 
The answer to this question is critical because it is used as the measure of success for 
each agency’s drone program. The cells in this column are shaded green for agencies that 
have successfully adopted drone programs and are flying the devices on law enforcement 
or public safety missions. Agencies that have tried but failed to implement operational 
programs have their cells in this column shaded red. The SJPD’s cell is yellow because 
that department’s program is not yet operational but the department has received city 
council approval to fly its drones on missions.  
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Table 2.   Completed Drone Implementation Multicase Study164 
 
 
                                                 
164 Adapted from “Table 8—California”; “Table 8—Texas”; “Table 10—California,” Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, accessed March 29, 2017, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2012/tables/10tabledatadecpdf/table-10-state-cuts/table_10_offenses_known_to_law_enforcement_cali 
fornia_by_metropolitan_and_nonmetropolitan_counties_2012.xls; “Table 8—Washington,” Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, accessed March 26, 2017, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-
u.s.-2012/tables/8tabledatadecpdf/table-8-state-cuts/table_8_offenses_known_to_law_enforcement_by_ 
washington_by_city_2012.xls; “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Seattle City, Washington; UNITED 
STATES”; “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Modesto City, California”; “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: 
San Jose City, California; UNITED STATES”; “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Arlington City, Texas,” 
United States Census Bureau, accessed July 14, 2017, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST04 
5216/4804000; “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Alameda County, California,” United States Census 
Bureau, accessed July 14, 2017, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/alamedacountycalifornia/ 
PST045216; California Secretary of State, Report of Registration as of May 19, 2014; California Secretary 
of State, Report of Registration as of September 9, 2016; “Cumulative Report—Official Tarrant County—
Joint General and Special Elections—November 6, 2012”; Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, Annual 
Report; “2012 Washington State Election Results”; Arlington Police Department, Arlington Police 




A major objective of this thesis is to investigate how a police department can start 
using drones to help its law enforcement missions. The use of small drones by hobbyists, 
corporations, and government is growing rapidly and it seems like the use of drones in 
policing is an inexpensive way for agencies that cannot justify the expense of a helicopter 
to gain many of the same benefits much more efficiently. Some of the agencies that tried 
to adopt drone technology had failed, seemingly because their communities did not 
support their use of unmanned aircraft because they did not trust the police to use them 
constitutionally or in the public’s best interests. Knowing that, the research done for this 
thesis, and summarized in Table 2, was meant to illuminate ways police and sheriffs’ 
departments could win the trust and support of the communities they serve. Would a 
process that treated the community as a stakeholder and partner be enough to do it, or 
were other factors involved, such as the agency’s pre-existing relationship with the 
community, the politics of the community, crime rates, or the jurisdiction’s demographics 
play a role in determining whether the people would trust the police and allow them to 
proceed with drone missions? For this comparative analysis, data related to individual 
hypotheses in the main research table are broken down into component tables and shown 
in Tables 3–6. 
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Table 3.   Tests of Hypotheses H1 and H2 



















Arlington PD 2011 No Yes Yes 
Alameda County 
SO 
2012 No Yes Yes 
San Jose PD 2014 No No/Yes No 
Modesto PD 2016 No Yes Yes 
 
 Hypothesis H1: If law enforcement agencies follow the community 
engagement and trust-building recommendations suggested by the IACP 
and USDOJ then they are more likely to adopt drone technology 
successfully in support of their law enforcement missions. 
The case studies showed a strong correlation between the use of IACP and 
USDOJ recommended community engagement practices and the ultimate success of a 
police drone adoption effort. Although an agency may not have begun the community 
engagement process before acquiring drones, the agencies that succeeded in creating an 
operational program did engage with their communities early and often, using a variety of 
methods and with a broad range of stakeholders. Both the SPD and the SJPD acquired 
drones in near secrecy, without the express knowledge or consent of elected leaders and 
the public. Both agencies faced a powerful public outcry in opposition to their use of the 
technology that ultimately led to political opposition and the suspension or termination of 
their adoption efforts. Seattle, as the first of the agencies in the sample to acquire drones, 
did not have the benefit of the guidelines and recommendations published by the IACP 
and USDOJ when they bought their Draganflyer drones, and it was apparent the agency’s 
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leaders did not see the need at the time to talk with their elected leaders or community 
about their plans for the devices.  
In San Jose’s case, the program was revived after the department apologized to its 
community for its lack of engagement and undertook efforts to meet with stakeholders 
and show greater transparency in its efforts to use drones as a public safety tool. 
Department leaders took their program to a city council appointed committee, the 
Neighborhoods Commission, and worked with that group to hold community meetings, 
conduct online surveys to gather community input, and use social media sites like 
YouTube to help spread their engagement to a broader audience. This case study was 
perhaps the most interesting of the five because of SJPD’s method and the results it saw. 
While its community, including privacy advocates, some media sources, and its elected 
leaders did not support the department’s process or drone use initially, the department 
was able to turn that around once it undertook a transparent engagement process that 
educated the public about the department’s intended uses for its drones and also sought 
the people’s input about police drone use over their neighborhoods. Eventually, the 
Neighborhoods Commission reported back to the city council and recommended they 
approve a pilot program for the police department to operate drones. Although the 
department’s program is not yet operational, it is an interesting turnaround that seems to 
indicate the validity of the recommendations by the IACP and USDOJ. 
The ACSO engaged with the public before it even purchased any unmanned 
aircraft, but still faced a strong public backlash over concerns about privacy violations. It 
continued to engage with civil liberties advocates and even included them in dialogue 
about policy development and how to use drones effectively while also protecting 
people’s constitutional rights. The ACSO and groups like the ACLU did not come to 
agreement on all items, but the agency’s engagement process during the adoption process 
and after has resulted in greater community support, or at least a lack of opposition, for 
its drone use. The agency also had the benefit of being able to rely on the political will of 
the elected sheriff. Unlike a municipal police chief, the elected sheriff answers directly to 
the voters and not to an elected council or board of supervisors. This distinction can give 
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an elected sheriff more authority than a police chief in the implementation of policies and 
programs.  
The police departments in Modesto, California and Arlington, Texas both 
successfully adopted their drone programs following strong efforts to engage with their 
communities and follow the processes formerly outlined. The APD implemented its 
drone program in 2011, one year after the SPD. This implementation occurred before the 
IACP and USDOJ COPS Office published their guidelines for how to implement drone 
programs successfully, but the engagement practices of the APD served as a model for 
others to follow. The USDOJ document specifically calls out the processes undertaken by 
the APD as examples.165 The MPD was the last of the sample agencies to begin using 
drones, and had the benefit of published recommendations and the ability to learn from 
the experiences of agencies that had gone before it. Its program manager, Lt. Ivan 
Valencia, specifically acknowledged that his department sought to follow the 
recommendations of the IACP, ACLU, and others in the implementation of its 
program.166  
The case studies in this thesis appeared to validate the first hypothesis. In every 
case, an agency that failed to follow the trust-building and community engagement failed 
to field an operational drone program. The agencies that followed some or all of the steps 
recommended by the IACP and USDOJ have successfully adopted UAS. The agency that 
seemed to best prove the validity of the recommendations was the SJPD since it did not 
engage the public or its elected leaders when it first tried to create a UAS program. It was 
unsuccessful in its efforts, but was later able to earn sufficient community support and 
city council approval for its use of drones after it reversed course and took part in a 
public conversation and debate.  
 Hypothesis H2: If a law enforcement agency has not previously earned 
the trust of its community then it is less likely to succeed in creating a 
drone program. 
                                                 
165 Valdovinos, Specht, and Zeunik, Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). 
166 Valencia, Modesto Police UAV Program. 
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It stands to reason that a police or sheriff’s department that engages in community 
policing and procedural justice practices outlined in the report by the President’s 
Commission on 21st Century Policing will maintain a relationship of mutual trust and 
respect with its community and be strongly positioned to succeed in the adoption of 
controversial technology like unmanned aerial systems. The police departments in San 
Jose, Arlington, Modesto, and the ACSO all appeared to have good relationships with 
their communities prior to their drone adoption efforts, but only three of the four have 
succeeded in getting their programs to operational status. San Jose’s situation was unique, 
because while it appeared to have the trust of its community before undertaking its efforts 
to use drones, its lack of transparency and engagement at the beginning of the process set 
it back. It was able to recover, but the research did not allow a conclusion about whether 
it was its subsequent engagement efforts, the agency’s previous relationship and 
reputation, or both that allowed that recovery.  
The SPD was the only agency in the sample that seemed to have a troubled 
relationship with its residents at the time of its drone adoption efforts. As noted 
previously, the SPD had multiple controversial uses of force at about the same time it 
secretly acquired its drones. Those incidents led to a great deal of community concern 
and a federal investigation by the USDOJ. The investigation determined the department 
engaged in a pattern and practice of unconstitutional policing resulting in federal 
oversight of the department that continues to this day. Against this backdrop, the SPD’s 
drone adoption efforts failed and it was forced to abandon its program. What the research 
did not make clear, however, was how much these pre-existing conditions contributed to 
the department’s failure to implement an operational drone program. The author found 
some correlation for this hypothesis, but could not prove it based on the experiences of 
the sample agencies.  
 Hypothesis H3: If a community is politically conservative, has a 
comparatively high crime rate, or smaller minority population, then it is 
more likely to support law enforcement’s use of drones. One could also 
state the inverse hypothesis. 
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Table 4.   Effect of Crime Rates on Drone Implementation167 













Seattle PD 5,094 598 No 
Arlington PD 4,130 522 Yes 
Alameda County SO 1,850 452 Yes 
San Jose PD 2,456 324 No 
Modesto PD 4,792 959 Yes 
 
The data for this complex hypothesis was inconclusive, but in some cases, showed 
correlation. Modesto was the most violent of the communities studied, with 959 violent 
crimes per 100,000 residents, and suffered the second highest rate of property crimes 
with 4,792 per 100,000 residents.168 The people of Modesto supported, or at least did not 
oppose, their police department’s use of drones. Seattle residents came out against their 
police implementing a drone program, even though that city had the highest property 
crime rate and second highest violent crime rate of the sample agencies.169 The data city 
of San Jose had the lowest violent crime rate and the second lowest property crime rate in 
the sample, at 324 and 2,456, respectively.170 That city originally opposed the 
department’s use of drones but later came to support it. Alameda County and Arlington, 
Texas both supported their law enforcement agencies’ drone programs, even though the 
two communities had dramatically different property crime rates at 1,850 and 4,130, 
respectively.171 Their rates of violent crimes were a closer match with 452 for the areas 
                                                 
167 Adapted from “Table 8—Washington”; “Table 8—Texas”; “Table 8—California”; “Table 10—
California.” 
168 “Table 8—California,” 8. 
169 “Table 8—Washington,” 8. 
170 “Table 8—California,” 8. 
171 “Table 10—California,” 1; “Table 8—Texas,” 8. 
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served by Alameda County and 522 for Arlington, Texas.172 The crime rate data 
correlated in some of the cases, but no clear patterns were identified that would tend to 
prove that a community’s crime rate was a reliable indicator about whether or not people 
would support or reject police drones. Instead, it appeared that a law enforcement 
agency’s efforts to include the community in dialogue about the use of drones were more 
critical to success or failure than crime rates.  








Seattle PD D: 69% R: 29% No 
Arlington PD D: 41% R: 57% Yes 
Alameda County 
SO 
D: 58% R: 13%  Yes 
San Jose PD D: 48% R: 20% No 
Modesto PD D: 41% R: 38% Yes 
 
The political preferences in a community did show a correlation to the acceptance 
of police drone programs, although only in some cases. It is difficult to state the strength 
of that correlation based on the data and small sample size. The test of this section of the 
hypothesis involved assumptions that a registered Republican was more conservative 
politically than a registered Democrat and more likely to support the police use of drones. 
                                                 
172 “Table 10—California,” 10; “Table 8—Texas.” 
173 Adapted from California Secretary of State, Report of Registration as of September 9, 2016; 
California Secretary of State, Report of Registration as of May 19, 2014; “Cumulative Report—Official 
Tarrant County—Joint General and Special Elections—November 6, 2012”; and “2012 Washington State 
Election Results.” 
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Seattle, with 69% of its voters identifying as Democrats and 29% percent as Republicans, 
represented one of the two most liberal of the sample jurisdictions, along with Alameda 
County at 58% Democrat and only 13% Republican.174 Seattle’s lack of support for its 
police department’s use of drones fits with the political component of hypothesis H3, but 
Alameda County’s support does not. San Jose’s political makeup, with 48% of its voters 
registered as Democrats and 20% as Republicans did not seem to correlate to that 
community’s initial rejection and subsequent approval of the SJPD’s drone program.175 
Arlington and Modesto, which both supported their police departments’ use of drones, 
came in as the most conservative sample communities. Both had 41% of their voters 
either register as Democrats or vote for the Democratic candidate, but Arlington’s 
Republican voters numbered 57% while Modesto’s were at 38%.176 Once again, not 
enough of a trend can be seen to conclude that the political preferences of a community 
are the most important indicator about that population’s willingness to accept police 
drones flying over their homes, businesses, and streets. Once again, the research testing 
this hypothesis was inconclusive. While political preferences in a jurisdiction showed 
correlation in some cases to that community’s acceptance of police drones, enough 
discrepancies occurred within the sample to prevent a certain conclusion. It did appear, as 
with the earlier component of H3, that the political preferences of the community played a 
smaller role in the successful adoption of police UAS than the agency’s efforts to involve 
the community and earn its trust. 
  
                                                 
174 “2012 Washington State Election Results”; and California Secretary of State, Report of 
Registration as of May 19, 2014. 
175 California Secretary of State, Report of Registration as of May 19, 2014. 
176 “Cumulative Report—Official Tarrant County—Joint General and Special Elections—November 
6, 2012”; California Secretary of State, Report of Registration as of September 9, 2016. 
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Asian:  7%  
Yes 
















Asian: 7%  
Yes 
 
The data did not show any identifiable trends linking the racial and ethnic makeup 
of a community on the people’s support for law enforcement’s use of drones. This section 
of the hypothesis came from a Monmouth University study showing significant racial 
variance in the responses about privacy concerns, with black and Hispanic residents 
expressing somewhat more concern than white and Asian residents.178 The racial 
demographic data from the sample jurisdictions did not seem to correlate to the success 
                                                 
177 Adapted from U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Arlington City, Texas”; “U.S. Census Bureau 
QuickFacts Selected: Alameda County, California”; “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Modesto City, 
California”; and “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: San Jose City, California; UNITED STATES.” 
178 Monmouth University Polling Institute, U.S. Supports Some Domestic Drone Use. 
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or failure of each agency’s efforts to fly drones operationally on law enforcement 
missions.  
Seattle, for example, did not support drone use even though it was the least 
diverse of the five communities sampled with 69% of its population identifying as white 
or Caucasian and only 15% as either African-American or Latino.179 San Jose, with 65% 
of its population listed as either African-American or Latino, 43% white and 32% Asian, 
eventually supported the police department’s drone program in contradiction to the 
assumption based on the results of the Monmouth poll.180 The U.S. Census reported the 
demographics in Arlington, Texas as 59% white, 46% African-American or Hispanic, 
and 7% Asian, but despite the significant minority populations, the APD’s acquisition 
and use of drones had broad public support.181 The population demographic figures from 
Table 2 for Alameda County and Modesto also fail to show a correlation with the 
public’s willingness to trust and support law enforcement’s use of drones. Both 
communities have significant African American or Hispanic populations, at 36% for 
Alameda County and 40% for Modesto, and despite the initial outcry in Alameda, both 
communities have supported the use of drones in police service.182 The lack of trend in 
this component of H3 seems to invalidate the racial and ethnic component of the 
hypothesis, indicating the racial or ethnic makeup of a community is less important to its 
resident’s support for police drone operations than the efforts an agency takes to engage 
with its community under hypothesis H1.  
D. CONCLUSION 
As expected, the research and analyses presented in this thesis validated the 
primary hypothesis, H1. The tests of the other two hypotheses yielded less conclusive, but 
no less interesting, results. The data showed a strong validation of Hypothesis H2, since 
the law enforcement agency that went into its drone adoption efforts with preexisting 
                                                 
179 “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Seattle City, Washington; UNITED STATES.” 
180 “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Arlington City, Texas.” 
181 “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: San Jose City, California; UNITED STATES.” 
182 “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Modesto City, California”; “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: 
Alameda County, California.” 
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trust problems between the police and community was forced to give up its UAS and 
abandon its adoption efforts. The remaining agencies did not appear to have major trust 
problems when they acquired their unmanned aircraft, and they have all either fielded 
operational drone programs or received approval to do so. 
As noted, hypothesis H3 was a complex one with three separate components to it. 
The data in this research indicated that the factors in this hypothesis were less important 
to the success or failure of a law enforcement drone adoption effort than the factors in 
hypothesis H1 and H2. The data from Table 2 showed the greatest level of support for H1, 
with a clear trend that agencies following the community engagement recommendations 
in the guidelines from the IACP and USDOJ succeeded in creating operational drone 
programs while those agencies that did not follow the recommended processes failed. 
The clearest indication of this trend came from the SJPD, which initially ignored the 
recommended principles and failed to win public support but eventually turned that 
around after it apologized and began a strong community engagement program.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. REVIEW 
While the use of unmanned aircraft by the police is still a relatively new trend, it 
is one that is growing at a rapid pace. In the period from 2010–2012, very few of the 
more than 18,000 state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies in the United States 
undertook the process of bringing unmanned aircraft, or drones, into police service. 
Agencies like the SPD, the APD, and the ACSO in California’s San Francisco Bay Area 
became pioneers with their early adoption efforts. Now, however, many more agencies 
have either implemented their own drone programs or are considering it. The MPD, the 
sample agency that most recently adopted a drone program, noted in its literature that 21 
law enforcement agencies from across the state of California have consulted with them in 
the last year about how to implement their own programs.183  
As detailed in this thesis, law enforcement agencies face a number of challenges 
to the implementation of this burgeoning technology, not the least of which is the 
commonly held fear about drone-enabled surveillance and the erosion of this nation’s 
privacy rights. Law enforcement officials frequently work to calm public fears of remote 
surveillance by fleets of cheap, easy-to-use drones by saying they will not use the devices 
for surveillance. These officials point out the limited capabilities of drones and how those 
limitations make them unsuitable for widespread, or long-term observation of even a 
specific person, let alone an area or the general public. They can only fly for 30 minutes 
or less on a battery charge, they have to be kept within the operator’s line-of-sight, and 
they must remain below 400’ AGL, etc.  
Proponents of police drones may be missing the point with these assurances, 
however, since they do not recognize or validate the concerns citizens and privacy 
advocates have about how the technology may be used in the future. As the technology 
matures, privacy concerns that may seem extreme today can possibly become more 
                                                 
183 Valencia, Modesto Police UAV Program. 
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reasonable. Drones in the future may be fitted with facial recognition technology, license 
plate readers, artificial intelligence, etc.  
Today, small-unmanned aircraft used by law enforcement and many hobbyists are 
flying cameras. They exist to observe and record aerial images of their surroundings. 
Little doubt remains that law enforcement will use them for surveillance. The question 
then becomes what kind of surveillance is both lawful and acceptable to the public? Not 
all surveillance is the same, nor is warrantless surveillance always a violation of the U.S. 
Constitution. Will the police use drones to conduct targeted searches for missing persons 
and fleeing criminal suspects, or general surveillance of an area or population? Will those 
efforts be short-term and incident specific, or will they become pervasive? What policies 
or regulations will be in place to protect citizens’ privacy rights in this new era of high-
tech surveillance? How should law enforcement use these devices to improve the safety 
of this country’s citizens without overstepping its authority and losing the trust of the 
people served? These issues make the implementation of a law enforcement unmanned 
aircraft program more than just a technical and budgetary exercise, taking it instead into 
the realm of community engagement and trust building. 
The data from this case study show that a law enforcement agency that follows 
the UAS adoption guidelines put forth by the ACLU, IACP, and USDOJ COPS Office is 
more likely to succeed in creating an operational UAS or sUAS program than those that 
ignore those guidelines. The examples of the APD, MPD, ACSO, and even the secondary 
efforts of the SJPD, show how community engagement and partnerships are beneficial in 
acknowledging and overcoming community concerns about privacy violations and abuses 
of power with the use of unmanned aircraft. In fact, agencies like the APD and MPD 
were able to use their drone programs as a way to build relationships and trust in their 
communities because of the strong efforts they took to engage with their residents and 
stakeholders. 
Based on these results, it seems clear that any agency looking to start its own 
drone program and fly the devices over their cities and counties can be well served to 
read and follow the IACP Guidelines and also the more recent document by the USDOJ. 
The community engagement, accountability, and transparency principles encouraged in 
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both documents offer a valid blueprint to follow, and also leave enough flexibility for law 
enforcement leaders to tailor their trust-building efforts to the circumstances and needs of 
their own communities. 
The recommendations published about law enforcement unmanned aircraft 
programs apply the general concepts of community policing, trust, and police legitimacy 
specifically to the implementation of these relatively new systems. The research in this 
thesis indicates that these recommendations are valid and that law enforcement leaders 
who treat their communities as partners in the implementation of any drone program are 
more likely to succeed in bringing the public safety benefits of drone technology to their 
cities and counties.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Now that the research has developed evidence validating the recommended 
guidelines published by the IACP and USDOJ, it is possible to get to the crux of the 
matter and discuss an action plan for law enforcement leaders thinking of adding 
unmanned aircraft to their departments’ toolboxes.  
1. Begin with a Needs Assessment 
Before beginning to allocate funds or applying for grants to buy a new drone, 
identify what community needs the equipment can meet. Most importantly, think broadly 
and do not just look at drones or UAS as a law enforcement tool. Involve other city or 
county departments in the needs assessment. The devices are useful in many arenas, 
including fire prevention and suppression, disaster planning and relief, and public works 
among others. Including other government functions and departments brings in more 
stakeholders to the project and can add a base of support. The law enforcement agency 
does not have to adopt all the other departments’ missions, but law enforcement is part of 
a larger public safety and government team, and these efforts may help those other city or 
county departments start their own programs.  
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2. Create an Engagement Plan 
Work with available resources, including community engagement or outreach 
specialists, to create an engagement plan tailored to unique community and agency needs. 
Each community will have its own unique political situations, key stakeholders, and 
needs. The unique nature of each situation should be built into the engagement plan. The 
plan should include comprehensive and broad efforts to reach members of the community 
and include not just education, but dialogue. These efforts should include the use of 
traditional and social media, surveys, community meetings, etc. to reach large numbers of 
residents. 
The plan should also involve influential community members and civil liberties 
advocates early in the process and continue that engagement through the needs 
assessment and policy development phases. As the ACLU has noted in the sample cases, 
a robust public dialogue should ensue not just on the potential uses of police drones, but 
also on whether they are needed.184 It does not mean an agency must reach consensus 
with all critics, but it is important to engage with the public and treat them as the partners 
they are in keeping neighborhoods safe. 
3. Inform and Involve a Jurisdiction’s Elected Leaders 
Political support is critical to the success of a law enforcement drone program, as 
presented in the five case studies. Law enforcement leaders trying to adopt a drone 
program should respect their city council or county supervisors by involving them even 
before beginning outreach to the community. Do not surprise them. It is crucial to 
educate the council members or supervisors about the benefits and challenges of drones 
for law enforcement, and also explain: 
 How you will engage the public and earn their trust 
 Ideas for potential uses and restrictions 
 Commitment to ensure privacy and constitutional rights 
                                                 
184 Miller, “San Jose Police Department’s Secret Drone Purchase.” 
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 Safety measures 
Finally, be ready to answer questions, take input, and ask for the elected leaders’ 
help where appropriate. 
4. Implement the Engagement Plan/Develop Policy 
Now that an outreach program has begun, be ready to take input and include it in 
the plans/policy if appropriate. Also, take the community input seriously, and if the 
feedback indicates they do not want or need a drone program, be prepared either to 
continue working on earning their support or cancel the program. A technology program 
is not more valuable than the trust of the population.  
Select a group of stakeholders from agencies and communities to provide input on 
the development of a comprehensive policy that specifies when and how the devices can 
be used, when and how they may not be used, training and accountability requirements, 
and safety measures. Once the policy is written, ensure it is published online and 
available to the public.  
5. Program Implementation 
Now that the public have been engaged, their input taken, and folded into the 
policy and program, it is possible to work on funding, staffing, and training for the UAS 
program. It will be necessary to work with the FAA to obtain a certificate of 
authorization, train operators and observers, and slowly work the new tools into 
department operations. Continue to include the public and press in the program and 
frequently share information about how the drones are being used to improve community 
safety. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE SCHOLARSHIP 
This thesis focused on only five sample agencies to test the effectiveness of 
previously published recommendations on how American law enforcement agencies can 
earn public trust and support for their use of drones in public safety missions. While the 
results indicate the effectiveness of the recommended community engagement processes, 
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the research did not clearly answer other research questions about the impacts of political 
preferences or culture, demographics, or crime rates on a community’s willingness to 
accept law enforcement drone use. Future research can utilize a larger or differently 
focused sample to better control the variables and examine questions about the impacts of 
these issues. A researcher may also structure a study to examine regional differences on 
the successful implementation of law enforcement drone programs.  
Another topic for future research can be to examine the applicability of the trust-
building processes tested in this thesis to broader issues. Are these processes equally 
effective in earning support for the adoption of other potentially beneficial but 
controversial technology or practices? 
Finally, with the rapid expansion of drone use in government, commercial, and 
recreational uses, future research can focus on whether or not the tipping point has been 
reached in public acceptance; the point when the technology is so widely accepted that 
law enforcement no longer needs to undertake specially focused community engagement 
processes before adopting drones in public safety missions.  
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